IONIANS IN THE IONIAN WAR

The Ionian war was more complex than any previous war in which Greeks had fought one another.[1] Various factors contributed to its complexity. One of them was the uneasy partnership between Peloponnesians and Persians, which seldom functioned to the complete satisfaction of the former and was at times almost in abeyance. Other factors were the oligarchical revolution at Athens, which nearly plunged the Athenians into civil war, and the chameleon-like behaviour of Alcibiades, who within a brief period lent his services first to Sparta, then to Persia, and finally to Athens, though at all times serving primarily his own interests. Yet another factor was the multiplicity of Greek states directly or indirectly involved in the war. In addition to those of the Greek homeland and of Italy and Sicily which supplied contingents to the Peloponnesian expeditionary forces in Asia, all the members of the Delian Confederacy included at any time in the Ionian, Hellespontine, and Carian districts, numbering more than 150,[2] must have been affected to some extent by the war, though only a fraction of them played an active part in it. The aim of this paper is to consider the attitude of Asiatic Greek cities towards the war and the extent of their involvement in it.

The most powerful Ionian cities, Chios, Miletus, and Samos, present no serious problems. They are mentioned again and again by the literary authorities, and their status as active belligerents throughout the war is not in doubt. Chios was at the outset the principal instigator and champion of revolt and, though later hard pressed by the Athenians and at one time in danger of betrayal, succeeded in withstanding their attacks. Miletus was for long periods the Peloponnesian naval base, while Samos was the Athenian naval base for even longer. On the other hand, the position of lesser but not unimportant Ionian cities,[3] those of the second rank, with which the present investigation will be mainly concerned, is much less clear, and no two cases about which any evidence has survived seem to be precisely parallel. There has been a tendency on the part of modern scholars to try to produce a uniform pattern by making unwarranted assumptions. It is not, as I hope to show, entirely safe to assume either that, if a city is known to have been visited by Peloponnesian ships or troops and not to have been attacked by them, it must have been, and have continued to be, definitely committed to hostility towards the Athenians or that the converse is equally valid—or indeed that, if a city is known to have revolted from Athens, it necessarily continued to support the Peloponnesian cause unless there is evidence of its recovery by the Athenians.[4] The relation of many cities towards the major

[1] Thucydides uses τοῦ Ἰωνικοῦ πολέμου (8.11.3) but only in a local sense denoting 'the war in Ionia' and not distinguishing it from other wars. The less appropriate 'Decelean war' soon established itself as the conventional term, presumably representing the viewpoint of contemporaries resident in Athens, cf. Isocr. 8.37, 86; *Hell. Ox.* 7.3, 19.2 (Bartoletti); Dem. 18.96.

[2] R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), pp.538–61.

[3] It will be convenient, for the sake of brevity, to use the term 'Ionian' occasionally to cover all or most Asiatic Greek cities. This minor inaccuracy has respectable precedents, cf. Hdt. 5.37.2; 9.106.2; Thuc. 8.86.4. The modern term 'East Greek' is not altogether appropriate here.

[4] See, e.g., E. Meyer, *GdA* 4 (Stuttgart, 1901), 563–4 and 633, for conclusions based on such assumptions. Large fleets could certainly anchor in the harbours of insignificant cities without considering whether they were welcome or not. It

belligerents was neither so straightforward nor so static as has been imagined. The theatre of war in which fighting took place at sea or on land at one time or another between 412 and 404 extended from Byzantium to Rhodes, and yet the land armies at the disposal of each side were very modest, even by Greek standards, and the fleets seldom of any great size. It was therefore impossible for either side to exercise effective military control over more than a small part of this vast area at any one time,[1] and the Greek cities were to some extent in a position to act in accordance with what they considered to be their own interests in the light of changing circumstances.

The policies and motives of Ionian cities in the Ionian war are an important factor in the controversy concerning the attitude of the allies towards Athens in the era of the Athenian empire. Some scholars believe that their principal objective, in the Ionian war as at other times, was to throw off the yoke of Athens and recover their autonomy,[2] and that this interpretation is substantiated by the evidence of Thucydides.[3] Others maintain that the commons in allied cities were well disposed towards Athens and in conflict with oligarchical factions which were responsible for revolts; that the views expressed by Thucydides owe their origin to his political outlook and are not confirmed by his narrative.[4] Both these rival interpretations have some validity. There was, however, as I shall attempt to establish, yet another equally important element which in the Ionian war soon began to influence the attitude of some cities. Athens did not collapse within a few months, as had been confidently expected; the Peloponnesians proved to be ill equipped to perform their professed role as liberators; an even greater source of disillusionment was that Tissaphernes

should not be assumed that Loryma was well disposed towards Athens because an Athenian fleet called there (Thuc. 8.43.1), or that Icarus was in revolt because Mindarus sheltered there from a storm (99). Fleets of both sides were at Syme within a few days (41.4–43.1). In 427 Alcidas had called at various places on the islands and the Asiatic mainland which were certainly not in revolt, and although his supporters claimed that he was welcome, his fleet caused great alarm (3.29.2–33.2). The cities at which he called were mostly small, but they included Ephesus.

[1] There are significantly few references to garrisons established by either side, especially in the opening stages of the war. In 412 Chalcideus left a makeshift garrison at Chios (17.1), which was later reinforced by mercenaries led by Pedaritus (28.5; 32.2). In 410 the Spartans sent Clearchus to Byzantium (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35, 3.15; Diod. 13.66.5) and Hippocrates to Chalcedon (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.5; Diod. 13.66.2; Plut. *Alcib.* 29.6–30.1) as harmosts, each supported by a body of troops. The Athenians garrisoned Sestos (62.3) and Mytilene (100.3) in 411 and later Methymna (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.13; Diod. 13.76.5) and a number of cities on the Hellespont and Propontis: Lampsacus (Diod. 13.66.1, 104.8), Chrysopolis (ibid. 64.2), Selymbria (ibid. 66.4; Plut. *Alcib.* 30), Byzantium, and Chalcedon (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.1). The Athenians appear to have had greater resources of manpower at their disposal in the last years of the war, presumably because they were recovering from the Sicilian disaster.

[2] J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Eng. trans., Oxford, 1963), pp.84–6, p.315 with n.2, pp.376–8, and *BICS* 13 (1966), 1–12.

[3] For the Ionian war the most important passage is 8.2.2. In later statements feelings about independence are considered in relation to feelings about forms of government: the desire for independence was not to be curbed by the establishment of oligarchy either at Athens (48.5, the view of Phrynichus but evidently approved by Thucydides) or in the cities themselves (64.5).

[4] G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *Historia* 3 (1954), 1–41, especially 6–9 on Ionia, cf. his *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp.34–43. G. Bockisch, *Helikon* 8 (1968), 139–60, and D. Hegyi in *Hellenische Poleis* (ed. E. C. Welskopf, Berlin, 1974), 2.1018–27 (which contains some errors) seem to me to overestimate the influence of conflicts between rival political factions.

showed determination in pursuing his evident intention of reducing to subjection to Persia as many as he could of the Greek cities within his sphere of influence. Accordingly many Ionians, at any rate in cities of the second rank, seem to have devoted their attention almost wholly to self-preservation, believing that there was little to be gained from the war and much perhaps to be lost. Freedom was no longer to be won without much sacrifice or largely through the efforts of others. Cities which had not yet played an active part in the war tended to try to safeguard life and property by manoeuvring themselves into a position where they were not definitely committed to supporting either the Athenians or the Peloponnesians, though Lysander brought about some revival of support for the latter. Because neither side could spare the resources needed to coerce unwilling allies, this position seems in some cases to have been successfully maintained for a number of years, and apparently very little attempt was made by cities to put pressure on their neighbours after the opening months of the war. There was, however, a danger, which, as will be seen below, developed in later years, that when a general found himself in need of money for the maintenance of his forces, he might consider himself justified in plundering a city which had sought to opt out of the war by adopting this rather spurious type of neutrality.[1]

Much of the evidence upon which the present investigation is based derives from the eighth book of Thucydides, which covers a period of a little more than two years after the Athenian disaster in Sicily.[2] It is unnecessary to discuss here the abnormal features of this book, which is manifestly an unrevised draft, compiled probably soon after the events which it records.[3] Thucydides devotes his attention primarily to the major powers and leading personalities whose influence was largely responsible for the fluctuating course of the war, and he makes little attempt to analyse its effects upon lesser Ionian cities. Nevertheless, his narrative contains a mass of evidence, including details concerning even insignificant or inconclusive events which occurred at a multitude of scattered localities.[4] Despite some clumsiness in arrangement and occasionally an uncharacteristic lack of precision, its general authenticity is beyond question. The *Hellenica* of Xenophon, which records the middle and concluding stages of the Ionian war, is sketchy and superficial by comparison with the eighth book of Thucydides, but it does supply some valuable information about lesser Ionian cities during that period. The account by Diodorus, which is widely believed to have been derived through Ephorus from the Oxyrhynchus historian, also has some value, especially on the later years of the war, as have a few passages in the *Alcibiades* and the *Lysander* of Plutarch.

In order to illustrate how diverse was the involvement of lesser Ionian cities,

[1] Neutrality is not, strictly speaking, an appropriate term in the prevailing circumstances: cities which had not revolted were under an obligation to aid the Athenians, while cities which had revolted were under an obligation to aid the Peloponnesians. In practice, however, it was soon found that there was little to be gained by using local levies of most Ionian cities except in home defence (see below, p.34).

[2] Hereafter references where the name of the author is not stated are to Thucydides and those without a book-number are to the eighth book.

[3] Cf. F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and his History* (Cambridge, 1963), pp.83–9; de Romilly, op cit. (above, p.10 n.2), pp.53–4; my *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), pp.257–9.

[4] As R. Weil, *Thucydide Livre VIII* (Budé, 1972) *Notice*, xv, aptly comments, 'beaucoup des faits auxquels s'attache le scruple de l'historien sont apparemment le pain quotidien de la guerre.'

even close neighbours, in the war and how strangely indefinite and fluctuating their commitment to supporting the one side or the other might be, the next step will be to examine the evidence relating to a number of them. Unfortunately not all this evidence is unequivocal, and in some instances it is bedevilled by textual uncertainties.

I THE INVOLVEMENT OF LESSER IONIAN CITIES

(a) *Teos, Clazomenae, and Erythrae*

A particularly interesting case is that of Teos, a city of some importance which had normally paid 6 talents in annual tribute as a member of the Confederacy. Early in the summer of 412 Strombichides, the commander of the first Athenian squadron sent across the Aegean to Samos, sailed to Teos, where he demanded that the Teians should remain loyal to Athens. On learning that an enemy fleet was approaching he put to sea, but when he found his small squadron heavily outnumbered, he had to flee towards Samos. A force of troops from Clazomenae and Erythrae, which had both revolted, now arrived by land. The Teians at first refused to admit them but changed their minds when they realized that the Athenian squadron was in flight and would not return. These troops, after remaining inactive for a time, began to demolish the wall built by the Athenians on the landward side of the city, and they were later assisted by a small detachment of Asiatics led by a subordinate of Tissaphernes (16.1–3). Not long afterwards most of a Chian squadron pursued by the Athenians fled towards Teos: four ships were captured, but the remaining five reached their destination safely. These Chians then collaborated with the troops from Clazomenae and Erythrae in bringing about the revolt of Lebedos and Haerae, small towns situated not far from Teos in opposite directions (19.3–4). Both the Chians and the land force then withdrew from the vicinity of Teos, and Tissaphernes arrived there in person with some troops, who completed the demolition of the wall (19.4; 20.2). As soon as he too had withdrawn, another Athenian squadron appeared under the command of Diomedon, who concluded an agreement whereby admission to the city was granted to the Athenians as well as to their enemies (20.2).

This series of events, though it had little impact on the course of the war, shows how fluctuating and confused the situation in Ionia was at the time and illustrates the dilemma in which some cities found themselves. The demand by Strombichides that the Teians should take no hostile action implies that, in his opinion at least, there was a serious danger of revolt. On the other hand, their refusal to admit the force from the rebel cities so long as the return of his squadron was expected suggests that disinclination to desert the Athenian cause was widespread. The aim of the rebel force, after it was admitted, in starting to demolish the Teian wall was evidently to ensure unhindered access to the city along the isthmus on the landward side, where the acropolis was situated.[1] The intervention by troops in Persian service and eventually by Tissaphernes himself provides a strong indication that he intended, if possible, to keep a tight hand upon Teos, though he was unable because of his military weakness to establish a garrison there. Alarm at the prospect of renewed subjection to Persian domination must have damped any enthusiasm felt by

[1] G. E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey* (London, 1966), p.140.

the Teians for revolt from Athens, which seems to have been lukewarm even before this threat developed.[1] It is not surprising that they came to terms with Diomedon. A statement made by many modern scholars that the Athenians now regained Teos is based upon a misinterpretation of the evidence.[2] Although the Teians may subsequently have favoured Athens rather than the Peloponnesians, the agreement with Diomedon, as defined by Thucydides, stipulated only that they would admit the Athenians *also* (20.2, ὥστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς).[3] This curious compromise reflects the difficulties in which both the contracting parties found themselves. The Teians doubtless argued that, unless Diomedon could leave behind troops to protect them or at least remain long enough to help them to rebuild the wall across the isthmus, they would be unable to resist attacks even on a small scale launched against them from the mainland by enemies of Athens. Because the Athenians were desperately hard pressed, Diomedon could spare neither the manpower nor the time to safeguard the Teians adequately against the dangers to which they might be subjected. Accordingly he must have agreed, doubtless with some reluctance, that, if through *force majeure* they were to admit enemies of Athens to their city, their action would be condoned, provided that the Athenians, who would normally expect to visit Teos by sea, were guaranteed unimpeded access.

There is no further reference in the extant sources to the involvement of Teos in the war until almost six years later, when in the spring of 406 Callicratidas assumed office as *nauarchos*. One of the first military actions was to land troops at Teos, who infiltrated by night inside the walls and plundered the city. This information is provided by Diodorus (13.76.4).[4] At that time Callicratidas was suffering acutely from financial stringency caused mainly by the antagonism of Lysander and Cyrus towards him. He had been forced to send to Sparta for

[1] The troops from Clazomenae and Erythrae may well have left Teos before completing the destruction of the landward wall largely because they distrusted Tissaphernes and were reluctant that a Greek city should be at the mercy of the Persians.

[2] Cf. W. S. Ferguson, *CAH* 5 (1927), 316; *ATL* 1 (1939), 423; J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade* (Paris, 1940), p.307. The only extant record of military action at Teos during the remaining years of the war, which will be considered below, might be thought to support the view that the Athenians recovered the city in 412, but the passage in which Thucydides defines the agreement with Diomedon is unequivocal. Action taken by the Peloponnesians in 406 does not imply that Teos was then under Athenian control or had meanwhile given wholehearted assistance to Athens.

[3] G. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2 (Gotha, 1904), 1427, interprets this phrase correctly, cf. Steup, n. ad loc., who, however, follows Goodhart, n. ad loc., in defining the status of Teos as neutrality. As noted above (p.11 n.1), this term is inappropriate.

[4] In the preceding sentences of Diodorus (ibid. 3–4) the surrender of Delphinium, the Athenian fort on Chios, to the Spartans is recorded. For this reason some scholars have accepted an emendation of Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.15 by Schneider involving the substitution of Teos for Eion as the name of a place seized by the Spartans, who in the same sentence are stated to have taken Delphinium. This emendation is attractive, though by no means certain. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that, because Xenophon assigns these Spartan successes to the *nauarchia* of Lysander, Diodorus is mistaken in attributing them to Callicratidas. Xenophon does not credit them to Lysander personally but to the Spartans, and he uses the phrase ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον. D. Lotze, *Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg* (*Abhandl. sächs. Akad.* 57, 1964), p.25 n.5, rightly points out that here as elsewhere Xenophon is anticipating later events. The account of Diodorus should be accepted: it includes detail which is not in his conventionally rhetorical manner and seems to be authentic.

money and to make an urgent appeal to allied cities for contributions towards the upkeep of his exceptionally large fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.6–12; Plut. *Lys.* 6). Consequently his aim at Teos seems to have been the acquisition of booty, which Diodorus apparently considers to have been his principal achievement. Unlike Delphinium, which he had recently captured, and Methymna, which fell to him a little later (Diod. ibid. 3–5), Teos was not, to judge from the fairly circumstantial narrative of these events by Diodorus, occupied by an Athenian garrison. The Teians would very probably have granted Callicratidas admittance, either in pursuance of their policy of not resisting either side or because the forces under his command were very powerful (Diod. ibid. 4, *τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δυνάμεως*). He could not, however, being a man of the highest integrity, have permitted his troops to plunder a city to which he had been vouchsafed unopposed entry. If the Teians had prospered materially as a result of their efforts to opt out of the war, this prosperity caused them to be attractive prey.

Because these developments at Teos were not of great importance, Thucydides may well have omitted details which would have thrown light upon Teian attitudes towards the major belligerents. There does not appear, however, to have existed either any widespread eagerness for liberation from what Peloponnesian propaganda represented as enslavement by Athens or any violent antagonism between oligarchical and democratic factions, causing the democrats to regard Athenian rule as preferable to oppression by local oligarchs. On the contrary, the Teians were evidently among the first to appreciate that for less powerful Ionian cities active involvement in the war was unlikely to prove advantageous and might be extremely damaging; that, whether they chose to remain loyal to Athens or to revolt, their friends could give them little protection against attacks by their enemies; that the prospect of attaining genuine autonomy was remote, while the danger of finding themselves once more under the yoke of Persia was very real, as the arrival of Tissaphernes and his treatment of them must have made abundantly clear. Their decision to admit both sides perhaps betokens a certain lack of fortitude and may be regarded as a somewhat undignified expedient for keeping themselves out of trouble. Indeed, while the conventional accusation of softness directed against Ionians by detractors[1] is not generally valid, it appears to be more deservedly applied to the Teians throughout most of their history that to other Ionians.[2] Nevertheless on this occasion they acted with a prudent and far-seeing concern for their own security which for some years was amply justified by its results and may have influenced the attitude of other cities towards the war.

A neighbour of Teos which underwent noteworthy vicissitudes during the opening phase of the war was Clazomenae, which had normally paid only $1\frac{1}{2}$ talents as a member of the Confederacy. When Chalcideus and Alcibiades sailed to Clazomenae soon after their arrival in Ionia, they must have been confident that their appeal for revolt would be accepted without much opposition, as

[1] Cf. Hdt. 1.143.2–3; 4.142; 6.11–12; also the views expressed by various Thucydidean speakers, 1.124.1; 5.9.1; 6.77.1; 7.5.4.

[2] Cf. J. M. Cook, *The Greeks in Ionia and the East* (London, 1962), p.90: 'Teos slumbered in its hollow, taking life as it came and unwilling ever to struggle: the Teians opened their gates to all assailants'. Anacreon, the most celebrated Teian, expressly condemns the prevalence of martial themes at banquets (fr. 96, Diehl) and seems, unlike some earlier poets, to have felt distaste for war itself, cf. C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*[2] (Oxford, 1961), pp.270–1, 303–4.

they took only three ships with them. They were not disappointed (14.3). Because the city was situated on a small island near the coast and was unfortified (cf. 31.3), the Clazomenians began to fortify Polichna on the mainland, fearing that, if attacked by Athenian naval forces, they might have to evacuate the island (14.3). Soon afterwards troops from Clazomenae and Erythrae took part in operations at and near Teos, as has been noted above. Later, when the Chians were making strenuous efforts to support the defection of the Lesbian cities, an army of Peloponnesians and rebels marched northwards towards Clazomenae and Cyme, being intended ultimately to reach the Hellespont and instigate revolts there (22.1, cf. 8.2). The Clazomenian contingent which had served at Teos presumably joined this army, but the plan to proceed to the Hellespont was abandoned when the revolt of Lesbos was rapidly and easily suppressed (23.5). The Athenians then followed up their success on Lesbos by landing near Clazomenae, capturing Polichna, and transferring the Clazomenians back to their island, except for those responsible for the revolt who had fled to Daphnous (23.6). Clazomenae was thus again under Athenian control, but it remained ungarrisoned and unfortified (31.3). Early in the following winter Astyochus attempted to recover the city. Arriving with a naval squadron, he demanded that members of the faction favouring Athens should move to Daphnous and that Clazomenae should again join the Peloponnesians (31.2).[1] A subordinate of Tissaphernes associated himself with this demand, which was rejected. An attack on the city failed, despite its lack of fortifications, and all that the Peoloponnesians achieved was that the crews of some ships when stormbound on nearby islands seized property deposited there by Clazomenians (31.2–4). Thereafter evidence about Clazomenae is very meagre, but it was still on good terms with Athens in 410, when Alcibiades found refuge there after escaping from captivity at Sardis (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.10–11) and also in 407 when he sailed thither in haste to protect it from plundering raids by exiles (Diod. 13.71.1).[2]

References to persons responsible for the revolt of Clazomenae, to persons favouring the Athenians, and to exiles plundering their homeland suggest that in this instance there was conflict between sections of the population, though not necessarily between oligarchs and democrats. At first many Clazomenians evidently supported the crusade for independence from Athens, and local troops were sent beyond their borders to help in spreading revolts as widely as possible. When the offensive organized by the Chians failed so ignominiously, misgivings about the initial decision to revolt must have been widespread, especially when liberation from Athens seemed likely to be succeeded by subjection to Persia. There is no mention of determined resistance when the Athenian force from Lesbos took Polichna and regained Clazomenae. Nor is there any reference to any punishment imposed upon the Clazomenians. Probably the Athenians had the wisdom to hold only a limited number of

[1] This passage has been commonly misunderstood. The correct explanation was given long ago by Classen, n. ad loc. Astyochus demands that the Clazomenians generally should come over the Peloponnesian side, not merely the atticizers. The latter are to move to Daphnous in order that they can be kept under surveillance.

[2] A fragmentary text in *Hell. Ox.* 3.1 (Bartoletti) may refer to this episode. Unfortunately fragments of an Athenian decree of 407 confirming an agreement made by Athenian generals with Clazomenians settled at Daphnous does not throw any light upon the situation, cf. R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *GHI* (Oxford, 1969), No. 88.

ringleaders responsible for the revolt. If so, their policy was rewarded by the refusal of the Clazomenians to be browbeaten by Astyochus and by their determination in resisting his attack. Thereafter, so far as is known, the tide of war passed Clazomenae by, apart from some pillaging by exiles, whose object was doubtless to instigate a second revolt. They must have been too weak to attempt a coup without assistance from the Peloponnesians.

In the winter of 413/12 Erythrae, which had normally paid an annual tribute of 7 talents, joined with nearby Chios and with Tissaphernes in appealing to Sparta for military intervention in Ionia (5.4–6.1).[1] The Spartans gave priority to this appeal and concluded a formal alliance with Chios and Erythrae (6.4; 8.2). When Chalcideus and Alcibiades crossed the Aegean with their small squadron, they landed first at Corycus in Erythraean territory, and the revolt of Chios was followed by that of Erythrae (14.1–2). A contingent from Erythrae served with the force sent to Teos and neighbouring towns and also apparently on the abortive expedition towards the Hellespont, as has been mentioned above. Parts of Erythraean territory were under Athenian control, since Leon and Diomedon made seaborne attacks on Chios from the Erythraean forts of Sidoussa and Pteleon (24.2).[2] The Athenians, so far as is known, never attempted to recover Erythrae despite its value to the Peloponnesians as a mainland link with Chios. When Pedaritus was sent from Miletus to assume command at Chios, he marched his troops along the coast to Erythrae, whence he ferried them across to the island (28.5; 32.2). At the end of 412 Erythrae was the scene of a curious episode which, although its consequences were negligible, Thucydides records in some detail, doubtless because it throws light upon the character of the war. When Astyochus had left Chios and called at Corycus on his way to Miletus, he was recalled to Erythrae for consultations with Pedaritus, who suspected that some Erythraeans recently released from captivity at Samos were plotting to betray their city to the Athenians. Investigations satisfied Astyochus and Pedaritus that these suspects were innocent and had professed willingness to act as traitors solely for the purpose of persuading their Athenian captors to repatriate them (33.3–4). This incident illustrates how imperative it was in the particular circumstances of this war to guard against the danger of treachery and also how extensive was the use of propaganda, even indoctrination, when each side was striving to control as many Ionian cities as possible but was handicapped by the inadequacy of its military resources.

The Erythraeans were irrevocably committed to war with Athens through being admitted, together with the Chians, into alliance with Sparta (6.4), and their troops must have been in action at some stage against the Athenians, since some of them became prisoners of war at Samos. Yet there is no evidence that they attempted to relieve the pressure on neighbouring Chios, either by direct intervention across the narrow channel or by diversionary activity on the mainland, although the Chians were in desperate straits throughout 411 and continued for some years to be harried by the Athenians. There is in the extant

[1] About forty years earlier political unrest at Erythrae, probably amounting to a revolt, had led to Athenian intervention and the expulsion of a faction intriguing with Persia; see Meiggs, op. cit. (above, p.10 n.2), pp.112–15. Resentment may still have smouldered.

[2] Soon afterwards Astyochus was summoned from Erythrae by the Chian government to confer about measures to foil a conspiracy to betray Chios to the Athenians (24.6), and later he attacked Pteleon without success (31.2).

sources no mention of any further involvement by Erythrae in the war after the end of 412, except for one questionable reference belonging to its final year.[1] This dearth of evidence could be fortuitous, but it seems that the Erythraeans, among the prime movers of the crusade for liberation, soon began to share the general disillusionment felt by former allies of Athens. They were doubtless averse to coming to terms with the Athenians even though their flagrantly rebellious actions might be condoned, but they seem to have lapsed into inactivity. If they hoped thereby to emerge from the war safe and sound, their hopes were apparently fulfilled.

Thus, while Teos, Clazomenae, and Erythrae were neighbours, each has a totally different record in the war. Ironically enough, Erythrae, which initially played a more enterprising part than the other two cities, seems to have been ultimately the least affected by military action. It is remarkable that after 412 none of the three cities, so far as is known, exerted any pressure upon its neighbours, by force or by persuasion, to adopt its own war policy. What kind of diplomatic, social, and commercial relations did the three cities maintain with one another during the war? Unfortunately no specific evidence has survived. Yet it is tempting to conjecture that, especially in the middle years of the war when there was little military activity in their area, the relations between them did not differ greatly from those existing in time of peace.[2]

(b) *Cos*

Cos was very probably disaffected, and may have been in revolt, between 446 and 443[3] but thereafter resumed annual payments of tribute to the Confederacy, which for some years amounted to 5 talents. It evidently did not revolt in the opening stage of the Ionian war, since in the winter of 412/11 Astyochus, sailing from Miletus to establish contact with the newly arrived squadron of Antisthenes,[4] attacked Cos Meropis, which was unwalled and had recently been devastated by an earthquake. The city fell without resistance and was sacked. The Peloponnesians also made pillaging raids into the countryside, which was exceptionally fertile (Strabo 14.2.19), but released their Coan prisoners without ransom (41.2). At this time Tissaphernes had already adopted his policy of withholding part of the Persian subsidy paid to the Peloponnesians (cf. 29), so that their attack on Cos was probably undertaken because of financial stringency. Astyochus doubtless had another motive: because his record of achievement as *nauarchos* had been singularly unimpressive,[5] he must have been eager to have some positive exploit to his credit when he met the eleven commissioners sent from Sparta to advise and, if they thought fit, to dismiss him (39.2). Cos seemed likely to prove an easy prey because of the destruction caused by the earthquake. The humane treatment of the prisoners suggests that hitherto Cos had neither actively supported the Athenians nor refused to admit the Peloponnesians.[6]

[1] See below, p.27 n.3.

[2] If the arguments of J. M. Balcer, *Rev. suisse de numism.* 49 (1970), 25–46, are accepted, Teos established monetary links with Phocaea and perhaps with Ephesus early in the Ionian war. As shown by the present investigation, the relations between each of these cities and the major belligerents differed very widely.

[3] R. Meiggs, *Harv. Stud.* 67 (1963), 20–1; J. P. Barron in *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson* (Oxford, 1968), p.87.

[4] See below, pp.22–3.

[5] See my *Individuals* (above, p.13 n.3), pp.292–7.

[6] G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *BSA* 52 (1957), 119–26, maintain that Astypalaea,

Astyochus, hastening to meet the squadron of Antisthenes, evidently did not take any steps to ensure that Cos remained under Peloponnesian control; for shortly afterwards the island was being used by the Athenians as one of their bases for operations against Rhodes, which had recently revolted (44.3, cf. 55.1). Several months later Alcibiades with a small Athenian squadron, after exacting a large sum of money from Halicarnassus,[1] fortified Cos and left an officer in command there (108.2).[2] The purpose of the measures taken on this occasion at Cos is not explained by Thucydides. Probably it was to safeguard Athenian control of the vicinity, including the Ceramic Gulf, while the naval war was focused on the Hellespont: if Cos were to be attacked again, perhaps from Rhodes, its new fortifications might be expected to protect it until the Athenian officer could obtain help from Samos. There is no reference to the establishment of a garrison, which was doubtless beyond the military resources of the Athenians at the time, and the appointment of this officer without Athenian troops to support him suggests that a substantial number of Coans could be trusted to resist a Peloponnesian attack.[3]

A different impression of Coan relations with the major belligerent powers is created by two passages of Diodorus in which Alcibiades is stated to have plundered Cos, initially in 411 (13.42.3, *τὴν Μεροπίδα πορθήσας*) and again in 407 (13.69.5, *τήν τε Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον ἐδήωσε*). The first of these passages almost certainly contains an error, or at least a misleading overstatement, either by Diodorus himself or by Ephorus, whose account is widely agreed to have been his source. The occasion is palpably identical with that of the last reference by Thucydides to Cos discussed above (108.2): the preceding sentence of Diodorus deals with the visit of Alcibiades to Halicarnassus (13.42.2), as in the passage of Thucydides, and the following sentence of Diodorus with an episode at Antandrus (ibid. 4) which Thucydides records immediately after mentioning the return of Alcibiades from Cos to Samos (108.3–5). It is conceivable that Alcibiades demanded money not only at Halicarnassus but also at Cos, even threatening the Coans with violence if they failed to pay. Thucydides seems, however, to be drawing a distinction between the treatment of each of the two

capital city in the fifth century, was situated near the western extremity of the island, while Meropis was on the site of the later capital facing the mainland across the straits; that in the Ionian war the Athenians held Meropis, whereas the rest of the island favoured the Peloponnesians (ibid. 121 and 125). Meiggs, *Harv. Stud.* 67, p.35 n.88, is critical of this theory on the ground that it is not easily reconcilable with evidence about Cos during the Pentecontaetia. It is also difficult to believe that, even in the peculiar conditions of the Ionian war to which the present investigation draws attention, an island with an area of little more than 100 square miles can have been for years divided into a large zone controlled by the Peloponnesians and a lesser zone controlled by the Athenians. No one reading the narrative of Thucydides on the attack by the fleet of Astyochus, which contains a considerable amount of circumstantial detail (the Coans flee to the mountains and the attackers make plundering raids into the countryside, 41.2) would suspect that most of the island was already under Peloponnesian control.

[1] That Halicarnassus (cf. 42.2) granted valuable and consistent support to Athens is suggested by an official expression of gratitude issued early in 409 (*IG* 1^2.110a).

[2] Plut. *Alcib.* 27.2 evidently refers to the same expedition. On the reference to Cnidus in that passage see below, p.38.

[3] A. S. Nease, *Phoenix* 3 (1949), 107–9, collects evidence about *archontes* in the Athenian empire: some had the support of a garrison, but others evidently had not. P. A. Brunt in *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford, 1966), p.84, points out that shortage of manpower normally caused the Athenians to withdraw garrisons as soon as possible and to maintain their authority by other means.

cities, implying that money was not exacted at Cos. The most probable explanation is that Diodorus or Ephorus has confused the first visit of Alcibiades to Cos with the second or has in some other way misrepresented the circumstances of the first visit[1]—Ephorus perhaps maliciously, as he is thought to have been unsympathetic towards Alcibiades.[2]

The second reference by Diodorus to pillaging at Cos by Alcibiades (13.69.5) is not open to the same objections as the first. If in 411 the Coans seem to have been inclined to support the Athenians, there is reason to believe that four years later they were at least not hostile towards the Peloponnesians. In the summer of 407, not long before Alcibiades arrived in Ionia, Lysander assumed office as *nauarchos* and after leaving Rhodes called at Cos and Miletus on his way to Ephesus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1).[3] The context implies that his voyage was without notable incident, his visit to Cos being apparently as peaceful as his visit to Miletus undoubtedly was. It is highly unlikely that the Peloponnesians had gained control of Cos by force between 411 and 407. Throughout that period the main theatre of war was the Hellespontine area, where they lost their entire fleet. Although they built ships at Antandrus, they remained very weak in Ionia until the arrival of Lysander.[4] It is even more improbable that during this period the Coans deliberately chose to revolt from Athens and join the Peloponnesians, who could hardly have protected them from Athenian reprisals. It is much more likely that the Coans, recovering from the earthquake and the attack by Astyochus, felt themselves to be safe from another attack while the Peloponnesians were so weak and also from the oppression by Tissaphernes suffered by the Greeks on the mainland; that they were now accordingly less disposed to support the Athenians and tried to avoid commitments to either side. Xenophon states that Alcibiades, shortly before his return to Athens, had raised money in the Ceramic Gulf (*Hell.* 1.4.8), where there is known to have been support for Athens even at the end of the war (ibid. 2.1.15), but there is no mention of Cos, which lies off the entrance to this gulf. When after his sojourn in Athens he returned to Ionia with a large fleet, he soon found that he had insufficient funds to maintain it.[5] Always adept at finding plausible pretexts for actions which he considered to be to his own advantage, he could at least cite the visit of Lysander to Cos and the absence of recent evidence for assistance to Athens by the Coans and could thus claim to be justified in plundering their island. He seems to have adopted a similar method of raising money at Cyme soon afterwards, as will be mentioned below.

[1] E. L. Hicks in W. R. Paton and Hicks, *Inscriptions of Cos* (Oxford, 1891), p.xxv, suggests that Cos had revolted when Athenian prospects seemed hopeless shortly before the victory at Cynossema and that Alcibiades first plundered the Coans (Diodorus) and then fortified their city (Thucydides) before leaving a garrison (an unwarranted assumption from Thucydides: see above). This explanation is accepted by A. Neppi Modona, *L'isola di Coo* (Rhodes, 1933), p.36; but the versions of Thucydides and Diodorus are not so easily reconcilable.

[2] Cf. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, p.314 n.1.

[3] The chronology of this period is uncertain, but there is every reason to date the visit of Lysander to Cos before the plundering raid by Alcibiades, cf. K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 2.2 (Strasbourg, 1916), 273–4.

[4] Cf. Lotze, op. cit., p.14. Xenophon mentions that crews from Siceliot ships distinguished themselves at Ephesus in 409 in the defeat of the Athenian force led by Thrasyllus (*Hell.* 1.2.1–11), but he does not refer to the presence of any Peloponnesians. A mutilated passage in a new fragment of *Hell. Ox.* suggests that some Spartans were present, but they were probably very few cf. L. Koenen, *Stud. Pap.* 15 (1976), 58–9.

[5] Plut. *Alcib.* 35.4–5, see below, p.21 n.2.

If this explanation is accepted, he was only anticipating in a somewhat less culpable form the practice of many generals in the fourth century who, when experiencing difficulty in paying their troops, allowed them to plunder even allies whose loyalty was beyond suspicion.[1]

(c) *Cyme and Phocaea*

In the summer of 412, as has already been noted,[2] Peloponnesian and rebel troops marched northwards along the Asiatic coast towards Clazomenae and Cyme, their ultimate destination being the Hellespont (22.1). This force was soon disbanded and may not even have reached Cyme (23.5). The brief account of its inglorious expedition does, however, suggest that Cyme was already in revolt or was expected, at least by the enthusiastic Chians, to revolt if bolstered by external support. The same conclusion may be inferred from an episode in the following winter when Astyochus took refuge at Cyme during a storm (31.3), though a town of its modest size might well hesitate to refuse admittance to a Spartan *nauarchos*, even if he were not wholly welcome. About a year later some exiles from Methymna, planning to bring about a second revolt by their city (cf. 23.4–5), transported from Cyme to Lesbos a force of fifty hoplites who shared their political views (100.3). This project could hardly have been launched at Cyme without the consent of the Cymaeans.[3]

The attitude of Cyme towards the major belligerents appears in a different light in an episode recorded by Diodorus (13.73.3–6). Alcibiades sailed thither from Samos in 407 and, after making false accusations against the inhabitants in order to have an excuse for plundering them, tried to remove many of them to his fleet but had to release his prisoners when attacked by the rest of the population. After summoning reinforcements from Lesbos, he challenged the Cymaeans to battle, which they declined, and he had to be content with ravaging their territory. They then sent an embassy to Athens to charge him with 'having pillaged an allied city when it had not done any wrong'. Cyme might well have come to be firmly controlled by the Athenians in the period between 411 and 407, for which the literary sources are not at all satisfactory, but in that case even Alcibiades would hardly have delivered an unprovoked assault upon an innocuous ally. Indeed a later statement by Diodorus that after the battle of Arginusae some Peloponnesian ships found refuge at Cyme (13.99.6) is scarcely indicative of sympathy towards Athens.

The account of the attack by Alcibiades on Cyme has been suspected of being a fabrication on the part of Ephorus, from whom it was certainly derived by Diodorus.[4] There is no doubt that Ephorus seized every excuse, whether

[1] Thibron was sentenced to banishment by the Spartans when their allies brought this charge against him (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8). When the expeditionary forces sent out by the Athenians came to be composed increasingly of mercenaries, the plundering of allies became more prevalent (cf. Isocr. 8.46 and 134; Dem. 4.24 and 13.6).

[2] See above, p.15.

[3] Shortly afterwards the Peloponnesian fleet under Mindarus on its hasty voyage from Ionia to the Hellespont coasted along the territory of Cyme, apparently without making a landfall (101.2).

[4] G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge, 1935), 86; G. De Sanctis, *Studi di storia della storiografia greca* (Florence, 1951), p.170. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2, p.1575 n.1, though expressing some uneasiness about the episode, concludes that Alcibiades may well have attacked the Cymaeans but that Ephorus has falsely represented them as loyal to Athens; cf. Meyer, *GdA* 4, p.634. On the chronology Busolt and Meyer convincingly maintain that the attack by Alcibiades

justifiable or not, to refer to his native town. Yet, despite his local patriotism it is unlikely that, when writing about a period within the memory of some contemporaries, he can have invented an embassy which was never sent.[1] He may have exaggerated the tone of injured innocence attributed to the envoys. They could well, however, have claimed that Cyme had neither played an active part in operations against Athens nor ever refused admittance to Athenian forces, so that charges of disloyalty were unmerited. Such a claim cannot be refuted from the extant evidence, even though there are indications, mentioned above, that at the outset Cyme was at least in sympathy with the rebel cause. Alcibiades may have acted unscrupulously in his treatment of the Cymaeans, but he needed money for the upkeep of his large fleet[2] and could not afford to be fastidious in deciding which cities might legitimately by plundered.[3]

Cyme may therefore be included among cities which, after being disposed initially to revolt, though probably without being involved in military operations against the Athenians, do not appear to have been positively committed throughout the war to assisting the one side and opposing the other. Neighbouring Phocaea probably belongs to the same category as Cyme. While some of the evidence relates to the same episodes, the case for the inclusion of Phocaea in this category is based on different considerations, and the Athenians did not choose to treat the two cities in the same way.

When, as has been mentioned, Astyochus found refuge from a storm at Cyme, he had first sheltered at Phocaea, which may therefore be deemed to have been at least favourably disposed towards the Peloponnesians (31.3). A brief call by the fleet of Mindarus in 411 at a harbour in Phocaean territory when sailing towards the Hellespont (101.2) may possibly suggest that he did not anticipate hostility there or betrayal of his movements to the Athenians, who were on watch for him (100.2). Some four years later Alcibiades, as recorded by Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.5.11), 'after hearing that Thrasybulus was fortifying (τειχίζειν) Phocaea, sailed across (διέπλευσε) to join him',[4] leaving the main

should be linked with his visit to Phocaea when he left his main fleet in charge of Antiochus and that Ephorus has falsely dated it after the battle of Notium.

[1] S. Accame, *Rend. Linc.* 14 (1938), 387–8, believes that Ephorus found in his source a reference to an attack on Cyme by Alcibiades but, influenced by local patriotism, exaggerated its importance. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, p.313 n.2, accepts the authenticity of the episode on the not entirely cogent grounds that Ephorus must have known the truth about the history of his native town. See also R. Hošek, *Kyme* 1 (ed. J. Bouzek, Prague, 1974), 192, who has no doubts.

[2] Plutarch (*Alcib.* 35.4–5) states that he had often to sail off on fund-raising expeditions, whereas the close collaboration between Lysander and Cyrus secured generous pay for the Peloponnesians. E. F. Bloedow, *Alcibiades Re-examined* (*Historia, Einzelschrift* 21, 1973), pp.74–6, who does not cite this passage, refers in a footnote (n.442) to the effect of the payments made to the Peloponnesians, but he apparently fails to appreciate the gravity of the handicap imposed thereby upon Alcibiades, whose leadership he disparages here as elsewhere to an unjustifiable degree.

[3] According to Nepos (*Alcib.* 7.1–2) Alcibiades was accused of having made little effort to capture Cyme because he had accepted Persian bribes. Since his association with the Persians had long since ended (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.9–10 for his arrest by Tissaphernes), this charge is doubtless a calumny by his enemies seeking to discredit him. It does, however, suggest that the Persians may have had designs on Cyme at this time. Justin 5.5.2–3 is characteristically vague and muddled in dealing with the general situation at this time.

[4] This compound verb (which means 'sail across' ibid. 1.1.15; 1.5.14) is unsuitable for a voyage from Notium to Phocaea, as a glance at a map will show. It is entirely appropriate to a crossing of the Gulf of Smyrna from Clazomenae, to which, according to Diodorus (13.71.1),

fleet at Notium in charge of Antiochus.[1] Because Phocaea is thought to have revolted in 412 and is not known to have been subsequently recovered by the Athenians, many scholars conclude that it must still have been in revolt in 407 and refuse to believe that Thrasybulus can have been fortifying it. Some maintain that τειχίζειν must here denote 'besiege';[2] they cite no parallels for this meaning, which is indeed impossible Greek. Others accept the emendation ἀποτειχίζειν,[3] a verb used elsewhere in the *Hellenica* of a besieging force walling off a town (cf. 1.3.4). Such expedients are needless and undesirable:[4] they reflect a failure to appreciate the fluidity of the situation in Ionia during the war. Thrasybulus, who arrived from the Hellespont, could well have landed troops at Phocaea with the intention of fortifying it as a convenient port of call between the two principal Athenian bases at Samos and Lampsacus. The Phocaeans would not have to be regarded as rebels and enemies if, as seems likely, they had played no part in hostilities against Athens. To some of them his arrival may have been unwelcome, but their city was evidently unwalled and the prospect of seeing it pillaged and their countryside ravaged was doubtless even less welcome. Assistance could not be expected either from the Peloponnesians, who were far away, or from neighbouring cities, which would be reluctant to court Athenian reprisals. If such was their predicament, they could only hope that the Athenians would be prevented by commitments elsewhere from providing an adequate garrison, and this hope may have been fulfilled, since not long afterwards Phocaea was one of the places where survivors from the Peloponnesian fleet defeated at Arginusae found refuge (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.33).

(d) *Caunus and Phaselis*

It is not surprising that the relations of these two cities with the major belligerents are uncertain, since both were situated outside, and Phaselis very far outside, the area in which fighting took place. Caunus had seceded from the Confederacy either during the years preceding the outbreak of the Archidamian war or, more probably, in the early stages of that war[5] but was recovered, apparently quite soon.[6]

In the winter of 412/11, as has already been mentioned,[7] a Peloponnesian squadron under the command of Antisthenes arrived at Caunus after making a long detour by way of Crete through fear of interception by the Athenians

Alcibiades had sailed in haste from Notium to deal with raids by exiles (see above, p.15). Xenophon has perhaps shortened his narrative by cutting out this intermediate stage.

[1] Plutarch in the *Lysander* (5.1), evidently following Xenophon, states that Alcibiades sailed directly to Phocaea, but in the *Alcibiades* (35.5) that he went to Caria to raise money. In the latter passage Plutarch, though doubtless accurately attributing financial need as a motive (see above), has evidently misdated an earlier mission to Caria to which Xenophon refers (*Hell.* 1.4.8).

[2] Meyer *Gda* 4, p.634, cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2, p.1575 n.1.

[3] Cf. Hude (Teubner) and Hatzfeld (Budé). περιτειχίζειν has also been suggested.

[4] Underhill, n. ad loc., rightly rejects them. The manuscripts without exception read τειχίζειν.

[5] Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp.436–7, justifiably favours 430, when an Athenian force sent to collect money in Caria and Lycia was defeated and its commander killed (2.89).

[6] *ATL* 2 (1949), A9.98 (where its assessment is seen to have been enormously increased, perhaps as an indemnity).

[7] See above, p.17.

from Samos (39.1–3). Here Antisthenes evidently felt safe while awaiting the arrival of Astyochus with the main fleet to escort the newly arrived squadron to Miletus (39.4). Caunus, besides being sufficiently remote from bases being used by the Athenians, must have been thought to be sympathetic towards the Peloponnesian cause, though there is no evidence that it had revolted.[1] Before the end of the same winter Tissaphernes journeyed from Magnesia to Caunus to confer with the Peloponnesian leaders (57.1), seeking to heal the breach which had arisen at the preceding meeting at Cnidus and had led them to move their main fleet to Rhodes, where they had remained inactive for eighty days (43.2–44.4). Tissaphernes may have chosen Caunus as the venue for his conversations with the Peloponnesians because it was under his control, but he may equally well have chosen it as the most convenient meeting place on the mainland: it was within easy reach of Rhodes and also sufficiently remote from Chalce, where an Athenian squadron was keeping watch on the Peloponnesians (55.1), whereas Cnidus was uncomfortably close. The conference at Caunus was confined to preliminary negotiations; the formal treaty between Persians and Spartans was concluded 'in the plain of the Maeander' (58.1), presumably at Magnesia.

Caunus is next mentioned in a strikingly different context. In the late summer of 411 Alcibiades sailed from Samos in the direction of Caunus and Phaselis with thirteen ships, promising the Athenians that he would either bring back the Phoenician fleet of Tissaphernes to fight on their side or at least prevent it from joining the Peloponnesians (88). That Alcibiades chose to call at Caunus, as he certainly did,[2] with an Athenian squadron of thirteen ships, which was not a private force of his own, would be very remarkable if the city had revolted and was firmly controlled either by the Peloponnesians or by Tissaphernes, or by both jointly. He does not, however, seem either to have anticipated any danger there to himself and his Athenian crews or to have encountered any opposition. This episode does not suggest that Caunus was committed to implacable hostility towards Athens.

From Caunus he sailed on to Phaselis, which is not known to have revolted or indeed to have been previously involved in any way in the war. Here he evidently waited until it became clear to everyone, as it had long been clear to him from his acquaintance with the intentions of Tissaphernes (88), that there would be no intervention by a Phoenician fleet in the Aegean. He then returned to Samos, claiming that he was responsible for depriving the Peloponnesians of support by this fleet (108.1). During the period in which Alcibiades was engaged on this expedition a Spartiate officer named Hippocrates was at least for a time at Phaselis, whence he sent a report to the Peloponnesians about the Phoenician fleet (99). Because it was a port of call for merchant ships bound for the Piraeus from the eastern Mediterranean (2.69.1), Phaselis had

[1] According to Meyer, *GdA* 4, p.566, Caunus, like Cnidus (35.1), was in the hands of Tissaphernes; he cites no evidence for this statement, which may be merely an inference from 57.1 (on which see below). Other scholars ignore the status of Caunus.

[2] E. Delebecque, *Thucydide Livre VIII* (Aix-en-Provence, 1967), pp.107 (on 88) and 125 (on 108.1) doubts whether Alcibiades ever reached Caunus and Phaselis. It is true that the former passage is inconclusive on this point, but 108.1 (κατέπλευσε . . . ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου καὶ Φασήλιδος) is unequivocal. (The paper by the same author in *Annales de la Faculté de Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence*, 43, is not accessible to me.) On the other hand, Alcibiades evidently did not choose to go as far as Aspendus.

every reason to preserve friendly relations with Athens, though situated in an area dominated by Persian influence. Its remoteness from the theatre of war probably gave it the opportunity, which would doubtless have been welcomed by many minor cities, of not favouring either side more than the other.

(e) *Iasus*

A city which, provided that two textual emendations involving its name are considered to be acceptable, underwent a most remarkable series of vicissitudes during the war is Iasus in Caria. In 412, when it was the headquarters of the Persian rebel Amorges, who was collaborating with Athens,[1] it was captured and pillaged by Peloponnesian forces at the instigation of Tissaphernes. They handed the city over to him, and he established a garrison there (28.2–29.1). In 409, if the substitution of Iasus for Thasos in a passage of Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.1.32) is accepted, it was the scene of political violence which led to the expulsion of the Spartan harmost Eteonicus and of the faction supporting Sparta. Pasippidas, the Spartan admiral, was accused of having been responsible, in association with Tissaphernes, for the loss of Iasus and was banished. In 405, according to Diodorus (13.104.7), Lysander stormed and destroyed a Carian city which was an ally of Athens; he had the adult male population, which numbered 800, massacred and the women and children enslaved. The manuscripts give the name of the city as Θάσσων or Θάσον, but since Diodorus locates it in Caria, the emendation Ἴασον has been proposed.

It appears therefore that at some stage between 412 and 409 Iasus passed from the control of Tissaphernes to that of the Peloponnesians. The inhabitants may, like the Milesians and others,[2] have felt themselves to be harshly treated by the garrison installed by Tissaphernes and have expelled it with the encouragement, or even active support, of the Spartans, who then appointed a harmost. In these circumstances Tissaphernes may be expected to have reacted indignantly, and if the emendation of the passage in the *Hellenica* is correct, he took steps to re-establish his authority by inciting a section of the populace to expel both the Spartan harmost and the local supporters of Sparta and by somehow inducing Pasippidas, presumably by bribery or blackmail, to connive at this coup or even to render some assistance. Yet, while Tissaphernes seems to have thereby made himself master of Iasus again, he cannot have enjoyed control of it for very long, since before 405 it had become an ally of Athens once more.[3] This resumption of allegiance to the Athenians is unlikely to have been the outcome of military action by Athenian forces. It is more probable that another local uprising took place, caused by renewed resentment against Tissaphernes and encouraged by the series of Athenian successes in the Hellespontine area which suggested that the tide had turned. Because the supporters of Sparta had been expelled in the previous coup, any opposition to the renewal of allegiance to Athens may have been easily suppressed. The exceptionally severe treatment of Iasus by Lysander when he captured it in 405,

[1] I have discussed the relations between Athens and Amorges in *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 319–29.

[2] See below, pp.37–9.

[3] If the emendation of Diod. 13.104.7 is accepted, a fragmentary Athenian decree, *IG* 2^2.3, which provides evidence of friendly relations between Athens and Iasus, may well belong to this period of renewed alliance and is not necessarily to be dated before 412, as D. M. Lewis, *BSA* 49 (1954), 33, concludes.

which was indeed worthy of Cleon, may be considered to be a reprisal for having expelled a Spartan harmost and having chosen to become once more an ally of Athens.[1]

It is unfortunate that the part believed to have been played by Iasus in the war after 412 is dependent upon two textual emendations. The second of them involving the acceptance of Iasus as the city sacked by Lysander in 405 (Diod. 13.104.7) is as convincing as any emendation can be.[2] The emendation of the passage in the *Hellenica* (1.1.32) is somewhat less obvious: a Spartan harmost could have been expelled from Thasos in 409, and at that time Tissaphernes had long been at loggerheads with the Spartans. On the other hand, interference by him in a locality so far removed from his satrapy as Thasos is almost inconceivable. Hence there is good reason to believe that the episode mentioned by Xenophon occurred not at Thasos but at a city in Ionia or Caria.[3] The most appropriate place-name is Iasus.[4]

If this reconstruction is valid, the record of Iasus during the war is fluctuating and complex but perfectly credible. Persian suzerainty directed by Tissaphernes was found, as elsewhere, to be extremely irksome, apparently on two occasions, but opinion was divided on the question whether local interests would be better served by support for Athens or for Sparta. This division of opinion led to factional strife, as at Clazomenae.[5] Eventually, after experiencing subjection to the authority of Tissaphernes and of a Spartan harmost, Iasus decided to resume its allegiance to Athens, which it had never voluntarily relinquished. Although this policy proved disastrous because it led to the attack by Lysander, it doubtless seemed at the time to be the best way of escaping harassment and oppression.[6]

II FEATURES OF THE WAR AND THEIR IMPACT UPON IONIAN CITIES

(a) *The war at sea*

With the exception of Chios, the Greek cities on the Asiatic mainland and the adjacent islands played an almost negligible part in the naval operations which took place off their coasts during the Ionian war, though their contribution became somewhat greater in its closing stages. In the sixth century the Ionians had possessed strong fleets (1.13.6) and though naval development was hampered by submission to Persia (1.16) and the failure of their revolt, they supplied a powerful and efficient contingent to the fleet of Xerxes. Yet very few cities contributed ships to the Confederacy of Delos, and after 427 only Chios and Methymna remained. Thucydides does not refer to any ships from

[1] Cf. Lotze, op. cit., p.82 n.3.

[2] Lotze, op. cit., p.30 n.3; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp.577–8.

[3] Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 2.2.246.

[4] U. Kahrstedt, *Forschungen* (Berlin, 1910), p.176 n.17, is responsible for the emendation, which has been widely accepted, cf. A. Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 7 n.21; de Ste. Croix, *Historia* 3 (1954), 7 n.9; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, p.578. H. Schaefer, *RE* 18.4 (1949), 2085, who rejects the emendation, does not adequately account for the intervention of Tissaphernes at Thasos.

[5] See above, p.15.

[6] According to De Ste. Croix, op. cit., pp.8–9, the case of Iasus provides a notable example of loyalty to Athens and supports his argument that allied cities had no enthusiasm for liberation. This interpretation cannot be disproved, since the evidence is so inadequate, but it seems far more probable, as suggested above, that the citizens were disposed to favour Athens because they considered themselves to have been harshly treated by Persians and Spartans alike.

other Asiatic Greek cities serving with either side in the first two years of the Ionian war with the exception of one from Samos assisting the Athenians (16.1) and one each from Miletus and Anaea, which was the rallying point of Samian exiles, assisting the Peloponnesians (61.2). It may be thought surprising that, for a long time at any rate, neither side apparently made any effort to obtain naval support from cities which, though for many years they had possessed no warships, yet had strong naval traditions. The reasons, however, are not far to seek. The Athenians, having few allies in Asia upon whom they could rely apart from Samos, evidently preferred to extract financial contributions wherever they could and to use them for building up their own navy (1.3; 4). The Spartans issued orders for the construction of 100 ships in Greece (3.2), but this figure must have been chosen largely to stir their allies to action and dishearten the enemy.[1] There was every prospect that Athens would collapse within a few months (2.1–2; 24.5), so that the modest number of ships ready to be sent across the Aegean, or likely to come into service in the summer of 412, must have seemed adequate for the task in hand, especially as the arrival of a fleet from Sicily was confidently expected (2.3) and the Chians already had some sixty ships (6.4). To require other rebel cities to embark upon the lengthy process of building triremes and training crews cannot have been considered necessary,[2] even when the war did not end so soon as had been anticipated. It might also have been thought unwise in that it could have discouraged further revolts. What the Spartans needed was not so much additional ships as money to pay the crews of those already in commission. There are also indications that the Spartans began to doubt the competence and the willingness of the Ionians to fight effectively[3] and that at the same time the Ionians began to suspect the Spartans of betraying them to Tissaphernes.[4] Of the twenty-one ships lost by Mindarus at Cynossema, eight were Chian, but none of the others was Ionian (106.3).

After the destruction of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus and the subsequent departure of the Siceliot allies, the Spartans were severely handicapped by having very few ships in commission and seem for the first time to have made some attempt to obtain naval support from Asiatic Greek cities other than Chios.[5] Little progress, however, is detectable until Lysander became *nauarchos*. He then took over some ships at Rhodes and, after establishing his headquarters at Ephesus, proceeded to build up a powerful fleet there (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1, 10; Diod. 13.70.2–4; Plut. *Lys.* 3.3–4). What proportion of this fleet was supplied by the Asiatic Greeks cannot be determined: it was probably small, though the arrival of Cyrus, who adopted a more sympathetic attitude than Tissaphernes and was more generous financially, must have caused them to feel that they might after all derive some benefit from playing an active part in the war. When Callicratidas succeeded Lysander as *nauarchos*, 'he manned fifty additional ships with crews from Chios, Rhodes, and elsewhere among the allies' (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.3). These unidentified allies were not necessarily all, or even mainly, Asiatic Greeks.

[1] It is less grandiose than the figure of 500, which included contributions from the western Greeks, announced at the beginning of the Archidamian war (2.7.2).

[2] As will be seen from the next section, Sparta did not require these cities to contribute large numbers of land troops; this is more surprising because service on land demanded considerably less training.

[3] See below, p.34.

[4] See below, p.37.

[5] Cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2. 1555.

The composition of the fleet with which Lysander overwhelmed the Athenians at Aegospotami is not recorded,[1] but a monument dedicated at Delphi in commemoration of the victory provides some clues, though unfortunately not full and explicit information. This monument included statues of twenty-nine naval commanders serving with the victorious fleet. Pausanias, who describes the monument in some detail (10.9.7–10, cf. Plut. *Lys.* 18.1), records their names and cities, and a few of the blocks on which the statues rested have been preserved bearing inscriptions which include the patronymic in each case as well as the name and city.[2] Ten of the naval commanders were Asiatic Greeks, namely three from Chios, two from Rhodes, and one each from Cnidus, Ephesus, Miletus, Samos (doubtless an exile from Anaea), and a city which cannot be identified because the text of Pausanias is defective.[3] The remaining nineteen commanders in the group were Aracus, who was nominally *nauarchos*, two other Spartans, and sixteen from allied cities on the Greek mainland and adjacent islands.[4] The criteria adopted for selecting the persons honoured in this monument are not precisely determinable, but the evident solicitude of the dedicators to give the allies their due provides a strong presumption that every city contributing even a single ship was represented by a statue of its commanding officer and that cities supplying large contingents were represented by statues of two or more officers. The evidence of this monument points to the following conclusions. The Chians, when no longer hard pressed by the Athenian blockade, threw themselves into the naval war as wholeheartedly as ever and played a greater part than any other ally. The Spartan policy of calling for naval support from Asiatic cities other than Chios had made a certain amount of progress by 405, notably in Rhodes. Nevertheless the number of Asiatic Greek cities supplying ships remained small, and their contribution to the Peloponnesian fleet still compared unfavourably with that of allies in the Greek homeland, even though some of the latter had little or no naval tradition.

The Athenians do not seem to have modified their practice of relying almost exclusively upon their own ships and crews. The only palpable exception belongs

[1] Not even the total number of ships is precisely known, though he had 200 shortly after his victory (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5).

[2] Meiggs and Lewis, op. cit., No. 95, cf. J. Bousquet, *BCH* 90 (1966), 428–40.

[3] A lacuna precedes the words *ὑπὲρ τοῦ Μίμαντος, ἐντεῦθεν μὲν Ἀστυκράτης, Χῖοι δέ* (who are then named). Conjectural attempts to fill the lacuna name Erythrae as the city to which Astycrates belonged, since Mimas is a mountain in Erythraean territory, cf. Hitzig and Blümner, n. ad loc.; H. Pomtow, *RE* Suppl. 4 (1924), 1210. This restoration is not wholly convincing. There seems to be no reason why in the context Erythrae should need to be meticulously located (Epidaurus, ibid. 10, does need to be located because of possible confusion with Epidaurus Limera). The only other moderately well-known Erythrae (Paus. 6.21.11, *πόλισμα*) was situated on the northern side of Cithaeron many miles from the sea. Nor, if it were thought necessary to locate Erythrae, would it be natural to do so by reference to Mimas, which was not at all famous. Normally, when there is any risk of confusion, this Erythrae is identified as being in Ionia (cf. Paus. 6.15.6; 9.27.8). It is more likely that Astycrates belonged to some insignificant town which needed to be located as 'beyond Mimas' or 'over against Mimas' and which, as the context implies, had links with Chios (itself *ἀπαντικρὺ τοῦ Μίμαντος* Paus. 7.4.1). Astycrates may even have been in command of Chian ships. Textual difficulties could well have arisen because the name of the town, like many in this area, was not widely known.

[4] These cities are, with very few exceptions, identical with those ordered to build ships when the Ionian war had not yet begun (3.2). Eretria and Chalcis (the latter omitted in error by Pausanias, cf. Bousquet, op. cit., pp.438–40) had revolted in 411.

to the crisis preceding the battle of Arginusae when their generals, after receiving a reinforcement of ten Samian ships, 'assembled in addition more than thirty others from the rest of the allies, having compelled everyone to embark, and likewise also such Athenian ships as were abroad at the time' (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.25). Xenophon does not choose to identify any of these allies, but since he refers to them only after mentioning the arrival of the Athenian fleet at Samos, most of them were probably Asiatic Greeks, though others may have been islanders from the Cyclades and elsewhere.[1] In this desperate situation the Athenians pressed into service all able-bodied men, including even slaves, as crews for their own ships (ibid. 24), and they forced their allies to do likewise. The formation in which they drew up their fleet for battle at Arginusae was adopted because they recognized that their crews were inferior in quality to those of the enemy (ibid. 31).

Although the lesser Ionian cities made little impact upon the war at sea, it made a deep impact upon them. While many were for long periods untouched by hostilities, they were nevertheless exposed to hazards against which they could not secure adequate protection, whether they supported the Athenians or the Peloponnesians or tried to avoid specific obligations to either side. Because the war was fought over a vast area and communications were slow and inefficient, a city might at any time find itself under attack from ships sailing unexpectedly into its harbour. A notable example is the experience of Iasus, which was sacked by the Peloponnesians who landed without serious opposition because their ships were mistakenly believed to be Athenian (28.2). A further source of danger was that hardly any of the cities were fortified: they were therefore very vulnerable to attack even by modest forces.[2] The absence of fortifications, which was a legacy from the heyday of the Athenian empire,[3] is mentioned again and again by Thucydides, who evidently considered it to be an important factor in the war.[4]

The hazards and uncertainties for the Ionian cities were perhaps most acute during the opening stage of the war when neither side had a powerful fleet operating in Asiatic waters and both sent out squadrons piecemeal as they became ready for service. Thucydides records most meticulously the movements of these squadrons, and his narrative gives the impression that their commanders sailed hither and thither in coastal waters, almost as though blindfold, seeking without much success to ascertain the whereabouts and strength of their adversaries.[5] A small force might find itself uncomfortably close to a stronger force and have to try to outstrip its pursuers and reach a harbour, or harbours, where safe refuge might be found (16.2 with 17.1; 19.2–3). Another reason

[1] Diodorus (13.97.1) in a vague and inaccurate passage refers to 'islands' as a source from which ships were obtained.

[2] The shortage of trained troops, which was yet another source of weakness, will be discussed in the next section.

[3] Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp.150–1; W. Schuller, *Herrschaft der Athener im ersten attischen Seebund* (Berlin, 1974), pp.12–13.

[4] 31.3 (Clazomenae); 35.3 (Cnidus); 41.2 (Cos); 44.2 (Camirus); 50.5–51.1 (Samos); 62.2 (Lampsacus); 107.1 (Cyzicus). For a general statement from the Archidamian war, 3.33.2. There is hardly any evidence that rebel cities tried to protect themselves by building fortifications, but cf. 100.5, 103.2 (Eresus) and Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.26 (Antandrus). Most references to fortifications are to those built by the Athenians for the protection of cities under their control: 51.1–2 (Samos); 108.2 (Cos); Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22, Diod. 13.64.2 (Chrysopolis); Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.15, Diod. 13.66.1 (Lampsacus).

[5] For striking examples of occasions when such information was lacking see 33.2 (Corycus) and 42.1–3 (Syme).

why ships had to run for shore was the prevalence of sudden storms, to which triremes were extremely vulnerable.[1] Naval forces fleeing before an enemy or a storm would choose, if possible, to take refuge where they could be confident of being welcome, but they cannot always have been in a position to make such a choice, and, since the situation was so fluid, their unexpected arrival might cause embarrassment, even alarm, locally, especially if the authorities were trying to limit their involvement in the war.[2]

Because triremes could remain at sea only for brief spells, the Athenians and the Peloponnesians were unable to conduct the naval war exclusively from their main bases, which might be too far distant from areas where they wished their fleets to operate. Consequently it was important for them to control harbours which could serve as subsidiary bases where their ships could anchor in safety and, if necessary, be required. When the Peloponnesian fleet moved from Miletus to Rhodes, which then revolted, Athenian squadrons, which were sent southwards from their headquarters at Samos, first used Chalce and Cos as operational bases (44.3) and later Chalce only, as it was closer than Cos to Rhodes (55.1; 60.3). Many mainland and island cities possessed good harbours, some on sheltered inlets, which could provide a safe anchorage for a considerable number of ships, but if their harbours were used as bases by the Athenians or the Peloponnesians, these cities were exposed to dangers which they might prefer to avoid, especially as neither side had sufficient manpower for the establishment of garrisons at more than a very few key points.[3] Yet another danger, which, as already noted,[4] became prevalent in the last years of the war, was that the fleets of the major powers might conduct plundering raids upon the lesser cities in order to obtain funds for paying their crews.

The slow progress of the naval war must have surprised the Asiatic Greeks and disappointed those in revolt. Even when both sides had built up powerful fleets in Ionia, they remained reluctant to commit themselves to a major battle at sea (27.1–3; 38.5; 43.1; 63.2). Each side in turn, when temporarily enjoying a marked advantage in numbers, tried to provoke a decisive battle, but the other side was not prepared to face the obvious risks involved in accepting the challenge (79.2–6). The resilience of the Athenians combined with the deterioration of Peloponnesian morale resulting from the niggardliness of Tissaphernes caused the two sides to be equally balanced and led to stalemate.[5] Nor did the Athenian victories in the Hellespontine area bring the naval war to an end, because the Persian satraps could not allow the Peloponnesians to lose. It is not surprising that Ionian cities, in whichever direction their sympathies might lie, tended to become quiescent, so far as they could, at any rate until the effective collaboration between Lysander and Cyrus gave the war a fresh momentum.

(b) *The war on land*

It will be convenient in this section to reverse the order adopted in the preceding

[1] The effects of bad weather upon ships at sea is mentioned frequently, cf. 31.3; 32.1; 34; 42.1; 80.3; 99; also the notorious sequel to the battle of Arginusae, Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.35, Diod. 13.100.2–3.

[2] See above, p.9 n.4.

[3] See above, p.10 n.1.

[4] See above, pp. 13–14, 19, 20–1.

[5] Evidence on the quality of the rival fleets suggests that the Peloponnesians were somewhat more effective than the Athenians when receiving adequate payment from the Persians but tended to become inferior when the subsidy was withheld or drastically reduced, cf. 36.1; 46.4; 48.4; 80.1; 87.4; 106.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.29–31.

section and to consider first the effect of the war on land upon Ionian cities and then the extent of their contribution to it.

The size of the land forces engaged in the war was, as has already been noted,[1] very modest, and it was partly for this reason that many lesser cities were for long periods almost untouched by it, though they might at any time find themselves involved. The plans laid by the Spartans at the outset presupposed that it would be fought mainly at sea (3.2), since the most obvious way of forcing Athens to surrender was to destroy the Athenian navy. In any circumstances, however, some fighting on land was likely to be necessary,[2] and an almost exclusively naval offensive might not suffice to secure victory if the Athenians survived the initial attack and some of their allies remained loyal. The slow tempo of the war, which, as mentioned above, profoundly affected Ionian cities, is partly attributable to Spartan unwillingness to consign large numbers of troops to service across the Aegean.

The Spartan government cannot have contemplated sending abroad many of its highly trained hoplite regulars who had a few years earlier proved irresistible at Mantinea. These hoplites were not altogether well suited to a type of warfare which was most unlikely to involve conventional pitched battles. Far more important, the government had to consider the demands of the situation in Greece. Agis at Decelea required relays of troops to maintain the routine devastation of Attica, and much larger numbers would be needed if he were to feel that there was some prospect of taking Athens by storm (cf. 71). The challenge to Spartan authority in the Peloponnese had been suppressed but not totally eliminated and must not be allowed to revive. Nor could the Spartans hope to induce their allies at home to provide large contingents for service overseas. In the Archidamian war these allies had been reluctant to contribute their quotas to the League army even for relatively brief invasions of Attica when absence during a period of harvest was involved (cf. 3.15.2; 16.2). In 412 many of them were being required to supply ships and crews (3.2).

There was one source from which the Spartans might have drawn troops for service in the war in Asia. In 424 they had sent 700 helots under Brasidas to the Thraceward region (4.78.1) and in 413 a picked force of 600 helots and *neodamodeis* to Sicily (7.19.3); in 400 they were to send 1,000 *neodamodeis* under Thibron to Asia (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4) and in 396 2,000 under Agesilaus (ibid. 3.4.2). No comparable figures relating to the Ionian war have been preserved. Because Spartan war policy profoundly influenced the position of Ionian cities, this problem must be briefly examined. When the Euboeans made overtures to Agis at Decelea in the winter of 413/12, he obtained from Sparta 300 *neodamodeis* who were to have crossed to Euboea (5.1–2), but after the abandonment of this project nothing further is heard of them. Some *neodamodeis* and helots were doubtless recruited as marines and others as oarsmen for service on the very few Spartan ships operating in Asiatic waters,[3] and not only the marines but also the oarsmen are known to have been used as land troops. When Chalcideus and Alcibiades reached Chios in 412 with the first squadron of five

[1] See above, p.10.

[2] During the negotiations at Sparta before the war began there was rivalry between the delegations from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes about the area in Asia to which the Spartans should first send *ναῦς καὶ στρατιάν* (6.2). Although the latter term may be used of naval forces, here it undoubtedly denotes land troops.

[3] See U. Karhstedt, *Gr. Staatsrecht* (Göttingen, 1922), pp.318–19, on the personnel on the Spartan navy.

Spartan ships, they left their oarsmen there, arming them to fight on land and substituting Chians as crews (17.1). On the other hand, the marines remained on the ships and sailed to Miletus, where they presumably took part in the skirmish in which Chalcideus was killed (24.1) and certainly in the subsequent battle in which they were defeated by the Athenians (25.2–5). The oarsmen left at Chios numbered 500 at the time when the Spartan Pedaritus arrived there to assume responsibility for defending the city, bringing with him a force of mercenaries formerly employed by Amorges (32.2). Crews of Spartan ships in the fourth century are stated to have consisted of 'helots and mercenaries' (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.12), and when Thucydides refers again to troops serving under Pedaritus, apart from the Chians, in two later passages, he mentions only mercenaries (38.3; 55.3). Hence the oarsmen left by Chalcideus may have been predominantly mercenaries with only a small proportion of helots. At all events, they seem to have been conspicuously ineffective in engagements on land for which they were perhaps inadequately trained and equipped.[1] Four years later a force from the Greek homeland under the command of Clearchus at Byzantium included 'a few *perioeci* and not many *neodamodeis*' (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15).[2] The narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon thus suggest, though without giving explicit information, that the forces sent to Asia by the Spartans for service on land were meagre in size and perhaps deficient in quality.

It might have been expected that, when the naval war at first produced stalemate and subsequently defeats for the Peloponnesian fleet culminating in its annihilation, the Spartans would have modified their policy and sent out larger and better infantry forces. They could almost certainly have retarded, perhaps even reversed, the deterioration of their fortunes, especially in the Hellespontine area, in the middle years of the war if they had had a stronger hoplite force at their disposal, and they could surely have spared most of their *neodamodeis* for service abroad without endangering their security at home. They were, however, at this stage disillusioned. They had embarked upon the war confident that, without any great sacrifices, they would soon permanently rid themselves of the dangers arising from Athenian imperialism and would be in a position to assume unchallenged leadership of the Greek world (2.4). They found instead that Tissaphernes was determined, in return for Persian subsidies, to exercise a strict control over the Greek cities on the mainland which had revolted from Athens; that many of these cities were militarily incapable of helping others, or even themselves, and soon became reluctant to make much effort when they lost hope of achieving genuine independence. In these circumstances the Spartans persevered with their strategic plan, adopted at the outset, of relying on a Peloponnesian fleet maintained by Persian subsidies. Although this plan proved ultimately successful when at last they found in Lysander an outstanding leader capable of winning the wholehearted support of the Persians, they encountered many serious setbacks which led them even to consider abandoning the entire enterprise. Rebel cities had some justification for feeling that, for long periods at least, Sparta made insufficient effort on their behalf.

The Athenians, because of their heavy losses in Sicily, could not run the risk

[1] V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 19 (1937), 26, notes the inferiority of the troops under the command of Pedaritus.

[2] The rest of this force consisted of Megarians, Boeotians, and (cf. Diod. 13.66.5) mercenaries.

of committing a high proportion of their limited hoplite manpower to protracted service overseas. Consequently the land operations in Asia in which substantial forces of Athenian troops were engaged were few and did not last long. In the autumn of 412 the Athenians sent a strong force consisting of their own hoplites supported by Argives and other allies to try to recover Miletus (25.1). If this expedition had gained its main objective, as it nearly did,[1] most other rebel cities would probably have submitted (25.5; 26.3), so that the exceptional effort which it demanded was doubtless considered to be justifiable. In 409 another Athenian hoplite force, which was sent to Ionia under Thrasyllus, achieved some success initially but then suffered a costly defeat near Ephesus and was forced to make an ignominious withdrawal (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34 and 2.1–11). This project seems to have been strategically misconceived: it was probably undertaken because the restored democracy was at loggerheads with the generals in the Hellespont, whose offensive operations there were halted through lack of reinforcements.[2] In 407 Alcibiades had a large force of hoplites under his command when he left Athens for Samos (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21), but he may have left many of them to continue the blockade of Andros (Diod. 13.69.5). There is no record of any fighting on a large scale at this time in Ionia in which Athenian troops were engaged.[3]

Although the few offensives in which strong forces of Athenian hoplites served in Asia achieved very little, in less ambitious operations on land the Athenians were conspicuously successful. When they were in action against local troops, and sometimes against Peloponnesians as well, they were almost always victorious, as evidence limited to the first two years of the war will suffice to show. After they had landed on Chios, they proved far superior to the Chians (24.3), the most forceful of the rebels, and this superiority was maintained even after the arrival of Pedaritus with his mercenaries (38.3; 40; 55.3). During this period they were also successful at Mytilene (23.2–3), near Clazomenae (23.6), in Milesian territory (24.1), on Rhodes (55.1), at Lampsacus (62.2), at Methymna (100.3), and at Cyzicus (107.1). Despite setbacks at Haerae (20.2) and at Cnidus, where they narrowly failed to gain their objective (35.3–4), their record in engagements on land is very impressive. It is indeed much more impressive than their record at sea during the opening phase of the war.[4] This phenomenon is less remarkable than it would appear to be at first sight. Whereas at sea the two fleets seem to have been more or less equal in quality, on shore the Athenians were usually opposed by makeshift forces of local troops, who, as will be seen below, had received little training and must, as the war proceeded, have felt increasingly doubtful whether success for the rebel cause would bring them any worthwhile benefits.

A notable but strangely neglected feature of the war is that there is hardly any evidence of military action by Asiatic Greek cities after the first few months

[1] The Athenians were victorious on land and were preparing to invest the city when a powerful fleet arrived from the Peloponnese, and Phrynichus persuaded his colleagues to withdraw and not to fight a decisive battle at sea (25.5–27.6).

[2] A. Andrewes, *JHS* 73 (1953), 2–5. See also Diod. 13.64.2–4; 66.3–4.

[3] When Alcibiades attacked Cyme without success, he had to send to Mytilene for reinforcements (see above, p.20), which suggests that his own troops were insufficient in numbers.

[4] In the *Thesmophoriazusae* (produced probably in 411) Aristophanes seems to suggest that the performance of the army was at the time more creditable than that of the navy (833–9, cf. 804 on the defeat of Charminus off Syme).

except in defence of their own territories. In the winter of 413/12 Sparta had been greatly encouraged by appeals for support from malcontent allies of Athens, and in the following spring Alcibiades assured the ephors that, if he were sent to Ionia, he 'would easily persuade the cities to revolt by reporting to them the weakness of the Athenians and the eagerness of the Spartans' (12.1). Thucydides nowhere refers to any undertaking by would-be rebels to levy troops in order not only to secure and defend their own autonomy but also to support revolts by other cities and to coerce any remaining loyal to Athens. There must, however, have been at least a presumption that, if Athenian resistance did not collapse at once, rebel troops would collaborate with the Peloponnesian expeditionary force. In two other campaigns conducted by the Spartans, one earlier and one later, in which they claimed to be launching crusades for the liberation of enslaved Greek cities, these cities supplied contingents to serve under Spartan leadership as long as hostilities lasted. The first occasion was the mission of Brasidas to the Thraceward area, where he obtained military aid from cities which had been allies of Athens. Without their support he could hardly have challenged the army of Cleon at Amphipolis (5.6.4; 9.7). The second occasion was the result of the appeal by the Asiatic Greeks in 400 for protection against Tissaphernes: local troops served successively under Thibron (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.5), Dercyllidas (ibid. 3.2.17), and Agesilaus (ibid. 3.4.11, 20).[1] Although the Ionian war was not precisely parallel with either of these two other Spartan crusades, it has affinities with both, and yet the military contribution by cities on whose behalf it was ostensibly being waged was much less continuously sustained. The efforts made at the outset by the Chians to induce as many cities as possible to collaborate with them in fighting for independence (19.1, 4; 22.1; 24.5) have already been noted: the force from Clazomenae and Erythrae achieved some measure of success at Teos and elsewhere, but when later it was to have marched to the Hellespont, it was disbanded before it was even approaching its destination.[2] Thereafter rebel troops very seldom served beyond the boundaries of their own territories.[3] When the Chians were so hard pressed by the Athenian blockade that their situation became desperate (40; 55.2), none of their mainland neighbours is known to have made the smallest effort to relieve the pressure on them.[4]

At the beginning of the war the number of trained troops at the disposal of

[1] According to Diodorus, Thibron had 2,000 Asiatic Greeks under his command (14.36.2) and Agesilaus 4,000 (14.79.2). Because the Spartans were no longer in alliance with Tissaphernes but were fighting against him, the prospect of independence for Asiatic Greeks was clearly much brighter despite the risk of decarchies imposed by Sparta. Thus they were far more willing to supply contingents, though Xenophon suggests that they had little choice (*Hell.* 3.1.5).

[2] See above, p.15.

[3] Exceptions are: at Mycale in 411, when infantry from Miletus and neighbouring cities encamped there in support of the Peloponnesian fleet (79.4) but were not in action (see below, p.37 n.3); at Ephesus in 409, when some of the allies supporting the Ephesians were presumably Ionians (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–8, cf. ibid. 2 for some Milesians at Pygela); at Lampsacus in 405, when Lysander assembled troops from Abydos and elsewhere (ibid. 2.1.18). Among the benefits which the Peloponnesians expected to derive from the revolt of Rhodes was the support of its powerful infantry (44.1), but there is no evidence that Rhodian troops served on the mainland. Internal strife (Diod. 13.38.5) may have proved an obstacle.

[4] See above, p.16, on Erythrae. The allies mentioned in 40.3 who supported the Chian appeal to Astyochus to take action for the relief of Chios were certainly those from Greece and Sicily and not Ionians.

most Asiatic Greek cities must have been very small indeed. In the past the Athenians had made some use of allied contingents to supplement their own troops on important campaigns, but they seldom called upon Asiatic Greeks, apart from the Milesians, who could evidently be relied upon to provide hoplites of good quality (4.42.1; 53.1; 54.1; 7.57.4).[1] It had become an established Athenian policy not only to keep most Ionian cities unfortified[2] but also to debar them from building up standing armies, which might have been used in revolts against Athens or in local wars against each other. In these circumstances it might have been expected that, as the Ionian war continued, more and more Asiatic Greeks would have received the not very exacting basic training required to fit them for service in land operations under Spartan commanders and that they would have exerted an increasing influence upon the course of events. In fact, as has been seen above, the contribution made by these troops dwindled after the first few months. One reason for this surprising development seems to have been that the Spartans, who might have been expected to have pressed the rebels to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the conflict, lost any faith that they may have had in the military effectiveness of Asiatic Greeks when in the late summer of 412 the revolt of Lesbos collapsed almost as soon as it began (22–23).[3] It was at this point that the infantry force marching to the Hellespont under the command of a Spartan officer was disbanded (23.5). It is also significant that, when Astyochus wished to support an attempt to revive the Lesbian revolt, first the Corinthians and other allies from the Greek homeland (32.1) and then Pedaritus and the Chians (32.3) rejected his proposal. In contrast to the Siceliots, who distinguished themselves when called upon to play a part in operations on land,[4] the Asiatic Greeks, apart from the Milesians, evidently cut a very poor figure and doubtless came to be regarded with some contempt by the Spartans.[5]

Evidence from a later period that levies from Asiatic Greek cities might be unreliable, even after serving for some time under Spartan leadership, is provided by the account of an episode in 397 when Dercyllidas was campaigning in Asia against the Persians.[6] He had under his command a mixed force of Peloponnesians, Cyreans, and local levies when it was suddenly confronted by a large army led by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. According to Xenophon some of the Ionians and islanders took to their heels at once, abandoning their arms, while the rest of them showed clearly that they would not stand firm (*Hell.* 3.2.17). This forecast was not put to the test because the generals concluded a truce. The prejudice of a seasoned professional may well have led Xenophon, who was probably an eye-witness, to underrate the fighting qualities of a citizen militia, but his criticism can hardly be altogether without foundation.[7]

[1] Even for the Sicilian expedition the only Asiatic Greek troops conscripted were from Miletus, Samos, Tenedos, and Rhodes (7.57.4–6), the Rhodians being slingers (6.43).

[2] See above, p.28.

[3] Astyochus supplied rebels at Eresus with arms (23.4), but there is no mention of similar action elsewhere.

[4] 28.2 (Iasus); Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.10 (Ephesus), cf. ibid. 1.1.26 (Antandrus).

[5] It is noteworthy that, although Cyrus was in Asia Minor when he was organizing his expedition against his brother, none of the Cyreans whose provenance is known was an Asiatic Greek, apart from one Chian and one Samian, cf. H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933), p.28.

[6] Most of the troops recruited by Thibron nearly three years earlier were presumably still serving under Dercyllidas.

[7] At Cnidus in 394 the Spartan admiral was deserted by his Asiatic Greek allies, who fled to land (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.12; Diod. 14.83.7).

It must be acknowledged that some years later further training and experience under the leadership of Agesilaus had evidently improved the efficiency of Asiatic Greek troops: he took some of them with him when recalled to Greece in 394, and 'Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines' fought creditably at Coronea (ibid. 4.3.17).

To return to the Ionian war, the Spartans apparently soon concluded that, though neither they themselves nor their allies in Greece were prepared to send large forces overseas, the effort in trying to create an efficient land army from the levies of at any rate the lesser rebel cities would not yield compensating advantages. There appears, however, to have been another, probably more crucial, reason why the military contribution of these cities became so meagre after the first months of the war. Some of them seem to have had second thoughts about the desirability of throwing themselves wholeheartedly into the struggle, feeling that they would be well advised to extricate themselves from a now unpromising, even hazardous, situation before they were too deeply committed.[1] This attitude is largely attributable to the policy of Persia, which, as will be seen in the next section, proved to be very detrimental to the interests of the Asiatic Greeks.

(c) *The shadow of Persia*

Persian intervention in the war was directed mainly by the sinister and enigmatic Tissaphernes. He and Pharnabazus had been ordered to exact from the Greek cities in their areas the arrears of tribute which were claimed by the Great King but had remained unpaid because of the domination hitherto exercised by the Athenians. It was for this reason that both satraps sent delegations to Sparta to offer an alliance with Persia together with a financial subsidy to maintain a Peloponnesian expeditionary force sent to support revolts by allies of Athens (5.5–6.1). Tissaphernes at least undoubtedly intended from the first not only to reduce the Greek cities to the status of tributary subjects of Persia, as in the past, but also to curtail their independence very severely. This intention was, very naturally, not publicly disclosed, and its full implications were not at once appreciated either by the Spartans, who claimed to be acting as liberators, or by most Asiatic Greeks, who were hoping for liberation.

At no stage of the war had either satrap at his disposal a powerful land force or apparently any ships at all, apart from the mysterious Phoenician fleet at Aspendus which, for reasons not precisely known to Thucydides (87), Tissaphernes did not choose to bring into action.[2] During the first campaigning season Tissaphernes had under his command some infantry, mainly if not wholly mercenaries (16.3; 20.2; 25.2), and a force of cavalry (25.2),[3] but he was evidently too weak to challenge the rebel Amorges at Iasus before the arrival of the Peloponnesians and had to persuade them to launch an attack on his behalf.[4] The names of three officers who served him as subordinates are known: Stages

[1] They may also have become less determined to resist the Athenians at all costs when they learned that rebel cities forced to submit were not being subjected to the savage reprisals which had been imposed on Scione. For the relative generosity of the Athenians, which was doubtless politic in the circumstances cf. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, pp.367–8.

[2] The problem is fully discussed by D. Lateiner, *TAPA* 106 (1976), 267–90.

[3] There is no means of determining what proportion of the force assembled by him for the defence of Ephesus in 409 consisted of his own troops (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–8).

[4] See above, p.24.

(16.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.5), Tamos (31.2; 87.1–3),[1] and Arsaces (108.4).[2] He used his meagre forces mainly to garrison Greek cities which had fallen into his hands[3] and not normally in action against the Athenians. The fear attributed to him by Thucydides that the Peloponnesians might plunder the mainland in order to obtain pay for their forces (57.1, cf. 109) illustrates his inability to provide military protection for his own territory. Pharnabazus had some infantry and cavalry in his service and was generous in lending as much support as he could to the Peloponnesians and rebel cities in the Hellespontine area. His efforts, however, achieved very little, and at one stage he was compelled to conclude an armistice with the Athenian generals.[4]

Although the Persian satraps were handicapped by this shortage of military resources, they were able to exercise a powerful influence upon the development of the war by exploiting the financial strength of Persia. The Peloponnesian expeditionary force was very largely dependent on the subsidy promised by Tissaphernes and soon found itself in difficulties if payment was delayed, reduced, or entirely withheld.[5] It was therefore Tissaphernes who called the tune,[6] especially when he had the benefit of advice from Alcibiades. The Peloponnesians soon learned that, if they were to continue to receive financial aid, they must allow the Greek cities, on the mainland at least, to be controlled by the Persians.

The aims of Tissaphernes emerge very clearly from the three documents which Thucydides, evidently believing them to be successive treaties concluded between Sparta and Persia, reproduces verbatim (18; 37; 58). As modern scholars have pointed out, the first two of these documents can only be drafts, perhaps rival drafts produced by each side,[7] and their content can hardly have been known in detail at the time to anyone not involved in the discussions, though Thucydides later contrived somehow to obtain copies of them. The Asiatic Greeks, who were evidently neither represented nor consulted, cannot have gleaned much information about the course of negotiations which were of vital concern to themselves. The third document (58), which alone has a formal heading,[8] does almost certainly reproduce the text of a real treaty which was ratified by the contracting parties.[9] Its first and most important clause stipulates

[1] He was an Egyptian (Diod. 14.19.6), who later served under Cyrus against Tissaphernes (Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.2).

[2] See below, pp.38–9.

[3] Iasus (29.1); Cnidus (109); Miletus (84.4–5; 109); Antandrus (108.4–5). Ephesus was under his control (109; Plut. *Lys.* 3.3) but does not seem to have been garrisoned.

[4] See below, p.42 with references.

[5] A striking illustration of this dependence on Persian subsidies is provided by the desperate situation of troops under Eteonicus at Chios towards the end of the war: in order to feed and clothe themselves they first worked as farm labourers and then conspired to plunder their Chian allies (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1).

[6] Cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., p.89.

[7] De Sanctis, op. cit., pp.84–93; A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides and the Nature of Power* (Harvard, 1970), pp.138–9. A further argument in favour of this interpretation is that at the meeting between the Spartans and Tissaphernes at Cnidus Lichas, if his protest is accurately reproduced by Thucydides, criticized both these two documents, especially the first (43.3–4): if they had been formally ratified treaties, the second would have superseded the first, which would accordingly have become null and void before Lichas expressed his views.

[8] This heading refers to the sons of Pharnaces, who included Pharnabazus, but he is kept in the background, perhaps deliberately. He was, in theory at least, subordinate to Tissaphernes, who was στρατηγὸς τῶν κάτω (5.4).

[9] De Sanctis, op. cit., pp.90, 93, expresses some doubt whether it actually came into operation.

that the Great King shall enjoy unrestricted control over his territory in Asia (58.2). How far the terms of this treaty were made public is not at all clear. The Spartan leaders may be thought to have been disinclined to expose themselves to the charge of having betrayed their Greek allies to Persia.[1] On the other hand, an expression of opinion attributed to Lichas that the Milesians and others in the territory of the King ought to be subservient to Tissaphernes and ingratiate themselves with him until the war was won (84.5) implies that the Greek cities were acquainted with the terms of the treaty. At all events, they displayed thereafter much less enthusiasm for the crusade against Athenian imperialism, except to some extent in the Hellespontine area where Tissaphernes had little influence. There seems indeed to have been a widespread feeling of disillusionment and of hostility towards Persia, which is most clearly attested by violent reactions against Tissaphernes and his subordinates in cities where Persian garrisons had been installed.[2]

The most important of these cities was Miletus, the headquarters of the Peloponnesians throughout the opening stages of the war. In 412 the Milesians distinguished themselves by defeating in battle the Argive contingent serving with the Athenian forces (25.3), and for some time they played their part in the war with enthusiasm (36.1). They must, however, have been increasingly exasperated when all their efforts and hardships brought the independence of their city no nearer, especially as they had a closer view than other Ionians of the uneasy relations between Peloponnesians and Persians and of the irresolute leadership of Astyochus.[3] It was against Tissaphernes and the Persians that they vented their anger in the late summer of 411. The Persians, evidently claiming to be exercising their rights under the treaty with Sparta, had built and garrisoned at Miletus a fort which the Milesians now captured by a surprise attack, expelling the garrison.[4] This action was welcomed by the Syracusans and others serving with the Peloponnesian fleet, to whom Tissaphernes was anathema because he seldom paid them promptly or in full, but Lichas, as has been noted, expressed strong disapproval (84.4–5). Tissaphernes sent an envoy to protest to the Spartan government about the seizure of his fort, knowing that Milesian representatives, accompanied by Hermocrates, were on their way to Sparta to lodge complaints against him (85.2–3). The outcome of this dispute is unknown: Thucydides does not mention it again before the abrupt end of the *History*, while Xenophon refers only to the charges brought by Hermocrates against Tissaphernes at Sparta (*Hell.* 1.1.31). Throughout the war the Milesians were unflagging in their determination to throw off the yoke of Athens, and their

[1] For a fourth-century condemnation of Spartan duplicity in the Ionian war for having at the same time promised to liberate the Asiatic Greeks and agreed to hand them over to Persia see Isocr. 12.103, cf. 4.122.

[2] C. Meyer, *Die Urkunden im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*[2] (Munich, 1970), pp.87–8, draws attention to the connection between the clause relating to Persian control of Asia (58.2) and the expulsion of Persian garrisons.

[3] Cf. 79.1–5 for an episode which must have annoyed the Milesians. Their troops were ordered to Mycale to support what was to have been a decisive action against the Athenians at Samos, but the Peloponnesian leaders changed their minds on learning that their fleet no longer enjoyed a substantial superiority in numbers.

[4] H. W. Parke, *JHS* 50 (1930), 47–9, convincingly maintains that the Spartans had handed over control of Miletus to Tissaphernes under the terms of the treaty. He cites as evidence (a) that Philippus, who was appointed harmost at Miletus in 412 (28.5), no longer held that appointment in 411 (87.6; 99) and (b) the remark by Lichas (84.5) mentioned above.

violent action against Tissaphernes in 411 shows that, appreciating the consequences of the Spartan treaty with the Persians, they were equally determined to make every effort to avoid subjection to Persia.[1]

Before the end of 411 Cnidus and Antandrus had also expelled Persian garrisons. Cnidus was already in revolt from Athens at the instigation of Tissaphernes when during the preceding winter a squadron arrived there from the Peloponnese under the command of the Spartan Hippocrates (35.1). At that time there was evidently no Persian garrison; for, when shortly afterwards the Athenians attacked and almost captured the city, it was eventually saved by the efforts of the Cnidians themselves aided by crews from the squadron of Hippocrates (35.3–4; cf. 41.3). Later in the same winter Tissaphernes held a stormy and abortive conference there with the eleven Spartan commissioners sent to advise Astyochus (43.2–4; cf. 52). It may well have been because of this breach with the Spartans that Tissaphernes installed a garrison at Cnidus in order to ensure that it remained in his hands and did not fall into theirs. Thucydides nowhere mentions the establishment of a garrison; he refers only to its expulsion as an event already belonging to the past in the autumn of 411 and, like the other expulsions of Persian garrisons, assisted by the Peloponnesians (109). During the same autumn Alcibiades was, according to Plutarch (*Alcib.* 27.2), operating with a small fleet in the vicinity of Cos and Cnidus. It is not expressly stated that he landed at Cnidus, but the Cnidians may well have had misgivings about the prospects of gaining independence through revolt and have ceased, at least for a time, to consider themselves to be at war with Athens. Later, however, a Cnidian leader, who was presumably in command of at least one ship, was honoured for serving under Lysander at Aegospotami (Paus. 10.9.9).

In the case of Antandrus, while the establishment of a Persian garrison is nowhere recorded,[2] Thucydides supplies some information about the circumstances leading to its expulsion (108.4–5). The Antandrians felt that they were being intolerably maltreated by Arsaces, who was a subordinate of Tissaphernes and evidently the garrison commander. They were afraid that they might be subjected to even worse outrages at his hands because he had treacherously massacred a body of Delians settled at nearby Atramyttium. Consequently they persuaded the Spartans to send hoplites to Antandrus overland from the Peloponnesian base at Abydos and with the aid of these troops expelled the Persian garrison from their acropolis.[3] In this instance it seems to have been not

[1] Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6–8 shows that Tissaphernes was still hated at Miletus a decade later, as indeed elsewhere (see below, p.40 n.3).

[2] In 424 Antandrus had been betrayed to Lesbian exiles, who planned to establish their headquarters there (4.52.3), but it was soon recovered by the Athenians (4.75.1) and its name has been preserved in the assessment of 421 (*ATL* A10.15). Presumably it revolted in 412 and was afterwards garrisoned by the Persians. Its coinage was on the Persian standard; see E. S. G. Robinson, *Hesperia*, Suppl. 8 (1949), 332.

[3] Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, p.356, believes that the hoplites sent from Abydos were Antandrians who had been serving with the Peloponnesian forces there, but Thucydides certainly implies that they were Peloponnesians. He would hardly have stated that the Antandrians 'introduced hoplites into their city' (108.4) if these hoplites had been local men returning home. The feelings attributed to Tissaphernes 'when he learned of this action also on the part of the Peloponnesians' (109) are more easily understood if the hoplites who helped to expel his garrison were Peloponnesians. Such is evidently the view of Diodorus, whose account of this episode (13.42.4) seems to depend ultimately upon that of Thucydides.

so much the presence of a garrison but rather the oppressive behaviour of its commander that was chiefly resented. It was probably to obviate a recurrence of such oppression that in the next year the Antandrians were building fortifications (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.26). At the point where the *History* of Thucydides breaks off, Tissaphernes is at Ephesus on his way to the Hellespont to protest to the Peloponnesians about the expulsion of his garrison from Antandrus and to defend himself against their accusations (109). Xenophon mentions his arrival at the Hellespont (*Hell.* 1.1.9) but unfortunately gives no information about the outcome of consultations which he presumably held with the Peloponnesian leaders.

He was in fact now in a very weak position. Because his military resources were so limited, he could not without assistance punish the recalcitrant cities and reinstate his garrisons. He might, and probably did, claim that the Spartans were under an obligation stipulated in their treaty with Persia to act on his behalf against those cities (58.4) instead of aiding them. He was, however, no longer able to coerce the Spartans by imposing financial sanctions, since their forces were now operating mainly outside his sphere of influence and were being maintained by his rival Pharnabazus. He thus forfeited, and indeed never wholly regained, his dominating influence over Peloponnesians and rebel cities alike which he had hitherto been able to exert by taking advantage of Persian wealth. Despite the impression created by Thucydides that he pursued his aims with great astuteness, he apparently failed to foresee that his harshness towards the Asiatic Greeks, whom he chose to treat as slaves of the Great King, might eventually damage his own interests. Perhaps he allowed his judgement to be warped by his unrelenting hatred of all Greeks, which is prominent at every stage of his career.[1]

These feelings of hostility came to be reciprocated in ample measure by the Greek rebels in his area. They probably mistrusted him from the outset,[2] and the longer the war lasted the greater became their abhorrence of him. Among their grievances against him was that he refused to support them financially. Why and when they were disposed to expect him to make payments to themselves as well as to the Peloponnesians is nowhere recorded. Their requests for money are attested only by a passage in which Alcibiades, then at the court of Tissaphernes and acting as his mouthpiece, is stated to have rebuffed them in very brusque terms. He told them that they were guilty of injustice if they were not now prepared to contribute in their own defence as much as they had previously paid to Athens or even more (45.4–5).[3] Later they found that under the treaty between Sparta and Persia, so far from receiving money from Tissaphernes, they had become once more tributary subjects of the Great King. There is, however, reason to believe that this tribute was by no means extortionate:[4] if somewhat speculative estimates by modern scholars are accepted, it seems to have been approximately the same as their previous

[1] Plutarch refers in different contexts to this hatred of Greeks: *Alcib.* 24.6; *Artax.* 23.1; *Ages.* 10.5; cf. *Lys.* 4.2.

[2] See above, p.13 n.1.

[3] The slighting tone of this refusal is perhaps attributable to Alcibiades and not to Tissaphernes. As K. von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* 1a (Berlin, 1967), 763, suggests, it suited the plans of Alcibiades to make Tissaphernes unpopular with the Peloponnesians and rebel cities alike because he hoped eventually to bring him over to the Athenian side.

[4] O. Murray, *Historia* 15 (1966), 148, 151.

payments as subject allies of Athens,[1] though whether they derived comparable benefits therefrom is highly questionable. They must also have resented the policy of Tissaphernes in withholding his subsidy for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet; for his aim was seen to be to weaken and exhaust both sides by prolonging the war and thus to ensure that Persian control of the Asiatic coast should become unassailable. It was, however, his repressive and coercive treatment of the rebel cities in his area that gave rise to the most bitter animosity not only from those maltreated by his garrisons but also from those subjected to lesser indignities.[2] None of them could feel safe from curtailments of their freedom which might prove worse than any imposed upon them by Athens. Nor could they now rely upon protection by the Peloponnesians, which, though it might, as noted above, actually be granted to them, was expressly debarred by the treaty with Persia. Nothing was more irksome to Greeks than to be regarded as inferiors.[3]

The attitude of Tissaphernes towards the rebel cities was probably the most potent factor in damping the initial enthusiasm among Asiatic Greeks for the war and in producing a tendency to avoid involvement in it. This conclusion is endorsed by the revival of effort, limited though it was, by these cities after Tissaphernes had forfeited most of his authority to Cyrus, who was sent down by the Great King to collaborate with the Spartans and to assume command of all the forces in Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3). At about the same time Lysander arrived to take office as *nauarchos* and soon established friendly relations with Cyrus, so that the policy of trying to weaken Athens and Sparta alike, which Tissaphernes had so persistently pursued, was now abandoned (ibid. 1.5.9). Lysander also made an effort to win the favour of the Asiatic Greeks. He may have shared the feelings of other Spartans in distrusting their fighting qualities, but if he was to succeed in rebuilding Peloponnesian resources in Asia, damaged by a long series of failures, he could not afford to neglect any source from which he might gain support. His first action on reaching Ionia was to transfer the Peloponnesian headquarters to Ephesus, where he vigorously carried through a programme of reforms, which are recorded by Plutarch (*Lys.* 3.3–4) in a colourful passage probably derived from Theopompus.[4] He found Ephesus well disposed to himself and to the Spartans generally but in a miserable condition and in danger of losing its identity as a Greek city through being vitiated by Persian customs, because Persian generals were usually based there. Accordingly

[1] E. Cavaignac, *Population et capital* (Strasbourg, 1923), pp.35–6; the weakness of his comparison lies in his arbitrary estimate of the proportion paid by Greeks in the total sum stated by Herodotus (3.90.1) to have been raised by Persia from a taxation district which included other races; cf. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 2.1.63 n.1 and Murray, op. cit., p.149. If, as is maintained by Murray, op. cit., pp.146–7, some cities at various times paid tribute both to Persia and to Athens, in these cases the burden would naturally be lightened by revolt from Athens.

[2] As stated above, pp.24–5, Iasus should probably be included among the cities cities which took action against him. For lesser indignities see above, pp.12–13 (his treatment of Teos).

[3] The unpopularity of Tissaphernes in Ionia was remarkably persistent, as is illustrated by the events after the death of Darius in 404. When Cyrus was sent down again to Asia Minor and his feud with Tissaphernes led to open war between them, all the Ionian cities deserted Tissaphernes and joined Cyrus, apart from Miletus, which wished to do likewise but was restrained by force (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6–7, cf. 9.9). The exaction of tribute by Cyrus does appear to have damaged his popularity (ibid. 1.1.8).

[4] R. Flacelière and E. Chambry, *Plutarque, Vies* 6 (Budé, 1971), p.163 with n.1.

he contrived to have triremes built and to stimulate trade and local manufacturing. This interesting but somewhat vaguely drawn picture suggests that Ephesus, though not actually garrisoned by the Persians, had been subjected to unwelcome interference by their leaders, including Tissaphernes himself, who had close links with the city (109; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6). Lysander could doubtless take steps to eliminate the excessive influence of Tissaphernes there without offending Cyrus, since the two Persians disagreed fundamentally in their attitudes towards the Greeks and later became enemies.[1] It may well be that Lysander through his friendship with Cyrus was able to secure from him an assurance that the Greek cities would be treated more sympathetically than they had been by Tissaphernes, provided that they paid their tribute to Persia. Lysander had, however, no prospect of being able to secure any modification of the treaty whereby the Spartans had agreed that the Asiatic Greeks should be Persian subjects. It was doubtless for this reason that, as seen above,[2] the material assistance which he obtained from them was limited. Most of them were probably lukewarm in their attitude towards him.[3]

The Greek cities situated in the satrapy of Pharnabazus were more fortunate in their relations with Persia than those in the satrapy of Tissaphernes. The two satraps had received the same demand from the King that they should exact the arrears of tribute claimed by him from Greek cities. They were thus in competition with one another when, before the war began, each offered to finance Peloponnesian support for revolts by cities in his area (5.5–6.2). This rivalry, which developed into bitter enmity (8.1–2; 99; 109), had a considerable influence upon the course of the war, which would almost certainly have been shortened if they had acted in concert and not against one another. In their dealings with the Peloponnesians and the Asiatic Greeks they adopted dissimilar methods, largely, it seems, because they differed fundamentally in character. Pharnabazus was far more open and generous than the subtle and devious Tissaphernes, and there is no evidence that he ever favoured the policy of trying to weaken both Athens and Sparta in the interests of Persia. He is said to have claimed, when conferring with Spartan leaders many years later, that, unlike Tissaphernes, he could not be accused of duplicity in word or deed during the Ionian war (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32), and this claim seems to be valid. When the Spartans sent a small force by land to the Hellespont to instigate the revolt of Abydos, he collaborated with Dercyllidas who was in command (61.1; 62.1), and his invitation to them to send a fleet from Miletus was combined with an undertaking to provide maintenance (80.2). Later, when the main Peloponnesian fleet was based in the Hellespontine area, he paid a subsidy which must have involved him in very heavy expenditure, but the scale of payment is unknown so that no comparison can be made with that of Tissaphernes. At all events,

[1] There is also evidence of hostility between Tissaphernes and Lysander. When in 405 the latter instigated the overthrow of the democracy at Miletus, democratic refugees were given a home and financial aid by Tissaphernes (Diod. 13.104.5–6, where there is, as elsewhere, confusion between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; Plut. *Lys.* 8.1–3).

[2] See above, pp.26–7.

[3] He courted the favour of extreme oligarchs in the cities. As most of these men were doubtless prosperous, this policy had the effect of producing contributions towards the prosecution of the war (Diod. 13.70.4), but according to Plutarch (*Lys.* 5.5–6; 13.5) its principal aim was much less commendable, namely to pave the way for the establishment of decarchies under his own control and thus to boost his personal authority.

there is no reason to believe that he ever failed to pay the subsidy regularly or in full; indeed after the destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus he gave to the survivors of the disaster money, as well as encouragement, and financed the construction of a new fleet at Antandrus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.24–5). Whether he made payments to any of the rebel cities is not determinable,[1] but he granted them as much military aid as he could when they were being hard pressed by the Athenians,[2] although, like Tissaphernes, he apparently had at his disposal only rather limited bodies of mercenaries together with a moderately strong force of cavalry. He led his troops into action more frequently than Tissaphernes and on at least one occasion displayed personal gallantry (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.6, cf. 4.1.32; Diod. 13.46.6; Plut. *Alcib.* 27.5). He was unfortunate in that during the campaign in the Hellespontine area the Athenians were exceptionally well led, and it may have been for this reason and not through any shortcomings on his part that he was so often on the losing side. Eventually the situation became so unfavourable that he concluded an armistice with the Athenian generals besieging Chalcedon and agreed to conduct an embassy to the Persian court (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.8).[3] When this undertaking was overruled by Cyrus, who had been sent down to assume supreme command, Pharnabazus treated the envoys with consideration and took steps to absolve himself from the charge of violating his oath (ibid. 1.4.1–7).

Although the treaty concluded by the Spartans and Persians applied as much to the satrapy of Pharnabazus as to that of Tissaphernes (58.1), the former seems never to have claimed to be entitled thereby to occupy and garrison Greek cities. He was probably content that they should become once more tributary subjects of Persia. Many Greeks in his area, though they must have learned how Tissaphernes had treated their fellow countrymen further south, were very willing to revolt from Athens when he persuaded the Spartans to send forces from Ionia (62.1; 80.2–3; 107.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.21–22). They evidently trusted him not to imitate the oppressive methods of Tissaphernes.[4] When neither he nor the Peloponnesians proved to be capable of defending them against the Athenians, some rebels doubtless had misgivings about the desirability of revolt: Byzantium was betrayed by a dissident faction and possibly Selymbria also.[5] Yet most cities in the Hellespontine area seem to have been prepared to defy the Athenians so long as they had any prospect of receiving external support. Abydos, which the Peloponnesians at various times used as their base, was twice successful in repelling Athenian attacks (62.2–3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16) and in 405, in association with other, doubtless smaller, cities supplied Lysander with an infantry force which helped him to take Lampsacus by storm (ibid. 2.1.18–19).

[1] See above, p.39, for the refusal of Tissaphernes to make such payments.

[2] Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16 and Plut. *Alcib.* 29.4 (Abydos); Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.26, 3.5 and Plut. *Alcib.* 30.1 (Chalcedon).

[3] M. Amit, *Ant. Class.* 42 (1973), 437–57, has discussed this agreement.

[4] It may be that Pharnabazus treated Greeks more sympathetically because, being the son of the previous satrap Pharnaces, he had been in frequent contact with them from boyhood.

[5] Byzantium: Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.14–21; Diod. 13.66.4–67.7; Plut. *Alcib.* 31.3–6. Selymbria: Diod. 13.66.4, διὰ προδοσίας, but Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade*, p.283 with n.1, is probably right in accepting the account of Plutarch, *Alcib.* 30.3–10, which credits Alcibiades with conspicuous gallantry in an assault resulting in the surrender of the city.

The progress of the war was less complex and more conventional in the Hellespont and Propontis than in Ionia and Caria. One reason was geographical. The Hellespontine area with its narrow seas and shorter coastlines afforded the major powers less scope for avoiding conflict with each other whenever they felt in danger of defeat; nor would the relatively few Greek cities have had the same prospect of withdrawing from playing an active part in the war even if they had so wished. Another, perhaps more influential, factor was that Pharnabazus was a far more straightforward character than Tissaphernes.

III SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The relations of lesser Ionian cities with the major belligerents in the Ionian war, and the extent of their involvement in it, varied considerably from time to time and from place to place. Yet, while local conditions, including conflicts between rival factions, played a part in some cases, certain general trends are traceable which influenced the attitudes and the fortunes of many cities. At the outset enthusiasm for revolt was widespread, and several cities collaborated eagerly with the Peloponnesians and with one another. Soon, however a reaction set in: they were disheartened both by the resilience of the Athenians and by the failure of the Peloponnesian expeditionary force to bring the war rapidly to an end, thereby securing genuine independence for them. Consequently, a tendency developed to try to avoid commitment in a conflict which now seemed unlikely to benefit them, though in fact such avoidance was not easily achieved because throughout the war any city might suddenly find itself a battleground or the objective of a plundering raid. Meanwhile the Spartans in their turn became for various reasons disenchanted. One of these reasons was that they found the Persians determined to exact a heavy price in return for financial aid; another reason was that the Ionian rebels proved to be incapable of producing military forces of even moderate quality as well as increasingly reluctant to make any sacrifice on behalf of others or even of themselves. The Spartans thus persisted in confining their commitment in Asia almost entirely to exercising authority over the confederate fleet, which was largely supplied by their allies in Greece and the west and maintained by Persian subsidies. On this occasion, in contrast to other occasions, they were evidently not prepared to send a substantial number of their own troops on active service outside the Peloponnese, though they might thereby have soon achieved military victory.

There was, however, one factor which, more than any other, damped the ardour of the rebel Ionians and the Peloponnesians alike, namely the policy of Tissaphernes. The Peloponnesians were aggrieved principally because, through his neglect to pay the subsidy regularly or in full, his intention of weakening both Sparta and Athens in the interests of Persia became increasingly plain. To the Ionian rebels, also adversely affected by the withholdment of the subsidy, a far more galling cause of complaint was his intransigence not only in demanding that the mainland cities should pay tribute to Persia but also in choosing to treat them as slaves of the Great King and to persecute them by installing garrisons where his military resources permitted. The expulsion of garrisons from at least three cities shows how bitterly his curtailment of their liberty was resented. Pharnabazus, who pursued a relatively liberal policy, was evidently far more congenial both to the Peloponnesians and to the Greeks living in his province. When Tissaphernes was virtually superseded by Cyrus, there was a limited

revival of collaboration by the Ionian rebels, which was reinforced by the tact and energy of Lysander. Yet they were apparently not prepared to forgive Sparta for having, as they not unreasonably believed, betrayed them to Persia and for having failed to protect them from Persian oppression. Throughout the war their role was that of pawns in a highly complex game, and, like pawns, though not without some influence upon the development of the game, they were frequently in danger of being sacrificed.[1]

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[1] I greatly regret that the valuable work by D.M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden, 1977), was not accessible to me until this paper was completed.